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I. Introduction
Consider the following not-uncommon scenario: High-level
employees of a public corporation fraudulently misstate the
corporation’s financials to make the company appear profitable and
attractive to investors and lenders. The financial (mis)statements are
certified by an outside auditor who failed to follow professional
standards in performing the audit. Eventually, the fraud is uncovered
and the true state of the company’s dismal financial situation is
revealed. The corporation’s stock price plummets and it goes
bankrupt. Creditors and shareholders of the company want to recover
their losses from, inter alios, the auditor who negligently performed
its audit. The failure, they allege, harmed them because the negligent
audit allowed the fraud to continue longer than it would have if the
auditor had met its duty under the engagement. 1 The auditor in this
scenario has a powerful defense in its corner: in pari delicto.
Under accepted agency principles, the knowledge of a corporate
officer is imputed to the corporation and the corporation is deemed
to have that knowledge. 2 Likewise, imputation makes the
corporation legally responsible for an officer’s fraud. 3 The officer’s
fraud is, in law, the corporation’s fraud which makes the
corporation a wrongdoer in front of the court. 4 The defense of in
1. The auditor’s duty is not to uncover fraud; its duty is to perform in
accordance with applicable professional standards and with the agreement between
the parties. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health, Educ. &
Research Found. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (AHERF), 989 A.2d 313, 332 (Pa.
2010) (“[T]here are multiple levels of auditor review, and the specific responsibility
of the auditor in any given undertaking generally will depend on the terms of the
retention.”); NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 882 (N.J. 2006) (“KPMG
had an independent contractual obligation, at a level defined by its agreement with
PCN, to detect the fraud, which it allegedly failed to do.” (emphasis added)).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006) (“[N]otice of a fact that
an agent knows or has reason to know is imputed to the principal if knowledge of
the fact is material to the agent’s duties to the principal . . . .”).
3. See id. (stating that an agent’s knowledge of a fact is imputed to her
principal “[f]or purposes of determining a principal’s legal relations with a third
party”).
4. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 951 (N.Y. 2010) (“[A]
corporation is represented by its officers and agents, and their fraud in the course of
the corporate dealings is in law the fraud of the corporation.” (citations and
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pari delicto5 prevents a wrongdoer from seeking redress against
another alleged wrongdoer.6 Because the corporation’s creditors or
shareholders bring their claim on behalf of the corporation, they “step
into the shoes” of the corporation and any defense that can be asserted
against the corporation may be asserted against them.7 In the
corporate fraud context, then, these doctrines work together to
immunize auditors from liability.
This Note argues that auditors should not be immune from suit by
or on behalf of a corporation imputed with its agent’s fraud. Strong
policy reasons exist both for protecting auditors from these lawsuits
and for leaving open the possibility of a lawsuit for auditor
malpractice.8 One factor that weighs strongly against insulating
auditors as a group is the way in which auditors have used the in pari
delicto defense to achieve immunity. Before a court allows the
defense—and stops a plaintiff from presenting its case no matter how
strong—it must be satisfied that the plaintiff is a wrongdoer seeking to
alterations omitted)).
5. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299,
306 (1985) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY to define in pari delicto). The
common law defense of in pari delicto comes from the Latin, in pari delicto
potior est conditio defendentis: “In a case of equal or mutual fault . . . the
position of the [defending] party . . . is the better one.” Id.
6. See id. at 307 (noting that the classic formulation of the defense was
narrowly limited to situations where the plaintiff was at least equally
responsible, but that many courts have given the defense broader application to
bar actions by plaintiffs involved generally in the wrongdoing (citing Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968))).
7. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006) (stating that a bankruptcy estate
includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F.
Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 356 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting in the bankruptcy
setting that the “trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and can only assert
those causes of action possessed by the debtor”); Wight v. BankAmerica Corp.,
219 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that because management’s misconduct
is imputed to the corporation and a trustee stands in the shoes of the
corporation, the trustee is barred from bringing suit that he himself essentially
took part in); Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 959 (holding that the doctrine of in pari
delicto will bar a derivative claim under New York law where a corporation sues
its outside auditor for professional malpractice or negligence in failing to detect
fraud committed by the corporation). But see F.D.I.C. v. O’Melveny & Myers, 61
F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that defenses based on unclean hands or
inequitable conduct do not generally apply against a party’s receiver because the
receiver does not step into the parties shoes but “is thrust into those shoes”).
8. See infra Part III.C (presenting competing policy rationales for and
against auditor liability).
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recover for harm caused by its own misconduct.9 Courts should
reconsider whether a corporation imputed with its agent’s fraud
satisfies this element of the in pari delicto defense.10
Imputation is not fault-based, and in pari delicto requires a
showing of fault. 11 A better approach would attempt to establish if the
corporation itself can fairly be deemed to be at fault for failing to
detect the agent’s fraud.12 This could be achieved by judging a
corporation based on the adequacy of its information gathering and
reporting systems.13 The systems implemented by the board of
directors and carried out by corporate employees to deter and detect
fraud would seem to offer a better measure of a corporation’s fault
and would provide a more sound basis for an auditor’s use of the in
pari delicto defense.14
Part II of this Note provides background information on
(1) imputation, including the adverse interest exception; (2) the in
pari delicto doctrine; and (3) case law addressing imputation and in
pari delicto in corporate fraud cases. Part III suggests why—
notwithstanding case law directly on point—this issue presents a
9. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 306 (noting that “[i]n a case of
equal or mutual fault . . . the position of the [defending] party . . . is the better
one” (emphasis added)); Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y.
2010) (defining in pari delicto as a mandate that “courts will not intercede to
resolve a dispute between two wrongdoers”).
10. See Art Metal Works v. Abraham & Straus, 70 F.2d 641, 646 (2d Cir.
1934) (Hand, J., dissenting), adopted as opinion of the court on r’hrg, 107 F.2d
944, 944 (2d Cir. 1934) (“Whenever the question has come up, it has been held
that immoral conduct to be relevant, must touch and taint the plaintiff
personally; that the acts of his agents, though imputed to him legally, do not
impugn his conscience vicariously.”); see also Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750,
754 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he defense of in pari delicto loses its sting when the
person who is in pari delicto is eliminated.”); infra Part IV (arguing that
imputation is not relevant to the determination of a plaintiff’s wrongdoing as it
relates to the defense of in pari delicto).
11. See Deborah A. DeMott, When Is a Principal Charged with an Agent’s
Knowledge?, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 319 (2003) (“Basic agency
doctrines are not fault-based . . . .”).
12. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that in pari delicto should only be
available in those cases where the corporation bears actual fault).
13. The author thanks Washington and Lee School of Law Professor David
Millon for suggesting consideration of a corporation’s information gathering and
reporting systems as an effective measure for corporate action.
14. See infra Part IV.B (suggesting that a corporation’s information
gathering and reporting systems provide the best measure of the corporation’s
fault in failing to detect fraud).
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problem and provides an opportunity to do better in future
controversies. Part IV suggests an approach that rejects the use of
imputation to satisfy the elements of the in pari delicto defense and
argues instead for a plaintiff corporation to be judged based on the
adequacy of its corporate systems.
II. Background
A. Imputation
A discussion of imputation and the adverse interest exception
is a necessary starting point to understanding the approach courts
have traditionally taken to analyzing auditor liability in corporate
fraud cases. When an agency relationship exists, 15 the rule of
imputation instructs that a principal is deemed to know facts that
are known by its agent. 16 The main purpose advanced to justify the
fiction of imputation17 is proper risk allocation.18 As between a
principal and a third party, the principal is in a better position to
bear the risk that his agent will act in a way that is not
sanctioned by him or will not convey knowledge the agent
receives on his behalf. 19 The principal is better able to bear this
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests
assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s
behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or
otherwise consents so to act.”).
16. See id. § 5.03 (“[N]otice of a fact that an agent knows or has reason to
know is imputed to the principal if knowledge of the fact is material to the
agent’s duties to the principal . . . .”).
17. See DeMott, supra note 11, at 292 (“Imputing one person’s knowledge to
another could be characterized as a quintessential legal fiction.”).
18. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 335 (Pa. 2010) (tagging the underlying
purpose of imputation to be “fair risk allocation, including the affordance of
appropriate protection to those who transact business with corporations”).
19. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006)
(“Imputation thus reduces the risk that a principal may deploy agents as a
shield against the legal consequences of facts the principal would prefer not to
know.”); Martin R. Scordato, Evidentiary Surrogacy and Risk Allocation:
Understanding Imputed Knowledge and Notice in Modern Agency Law, 10
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 129, 155 (2004) (“[F]rom a risk allocation
perspective, the possibility of an adverse agent failing to transmit successfully
to the principal important knowledge or notice is a problem far better managed
by the principal than by the third party.”).
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risk because of the internal relationship between principal and
agent.20 The principal selects, monitors, and controls his agents. 21
And imputation destroys a principal’s incentive to deploy agents as a
filter to receiving “bad” information.22 By holding the principal legally
responsible for his agent’s knowledge, the principal has strong
incentive to receive that knowledge. 23
1. Adverse Interest Exception
In some cases, the justification for imputation is outweighed
by other considerations. Imputation does not apply when “the
agent acts adversely to the principal in a transaction or matter,
intending to act solely for the agent’s own purposes or those of
another person.” 24 This exception addresses the reality that when
an agent has abandoned his principal’s interest, the presumption
that he will fulfill his duty to relay information to his principal
fails. While it is clear that the presumption fails, it is less clear

20. See DeMott, supra note 11, at 315 (suggesting treatment of imputation
“as a recognition of the fact that, when an agent interacts with third parties on
behalf of a principal, the internal relationship between principal and agent
shapes many dimensions of the agent’s interaction with the third party”); see
also id. at 317 (“Imputation may also be justified on the basis of its impact on
behavior.”).
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 illus. 8 (2006) (“Imputation
creates strong incentives for principals to design and implement effective
systems through which agents handle and report information.”).
22. See DeMott, supra note 11, at 315–16 (“Imputation responds to the
evident temptation for agents to be reticent in sharing ‘bad facts’ with their
principals.”). Imputation reduces the temptation of those in control of an
organization to create a structure which isolates “bad facts” in the hands of few
agents. See id. at 317–18 (noting that without imputation such a structure
would deflect the organization’s accountability to those with whom its agent
dealt).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) (“By charging a
principal with notice of material facts that an agent knows or has reason to
know, imputation reduces incentives to deal through agents as a way to avoid
the legal consequences of facts that a principal might prefer not to know.”); see
also DeMott, supra note 11, at 317 (“[F]rom a principal’s standpoint, it is
preferable that an agent transmit ‘bad facts’ so that the principal may
determine how to react as opposed to proceeding with a transaction in the
absence of actual knowledge.”).
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 (2006).
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why it matters. 25 In other contexts, when the presumption is
proven false, it is still maintained. 26 Addressing this conflict, the
Restatement (Third) of Agency sets out an exception to the
exception. Notice will be imputed when an agent acts adversely to
her principal “when necessary to protect the rights of a third
party who dealt with the principal in good faith.” 27
The third-party-protection exception to the adverse interest
exception demonstrates agency law’s goal of protecting good-faith
third parties. 28 It also shows an attempt to modulate the “unduly
severe” results that arise from agency law’s “all-or-nothing”
basis. 29 Courts have adopted further exceptions to avoid strict
25. See Scordato, supra note 19, at 155 (“[T]he existence of the adverse
agent exception to the imputed knowledge rule is not supported by the risk
allocation rationale.”); see also Goldstein v. Union Nat’l Bank, 213 S.W. 584,
590–91 (Tex. 1919) (offering an “incompatibility test” for the adverse interest
exception met when “the agent’s interests are so incompatible with the interests
of his principal . . . to render it reasonably probable that an ordinary person . . .
will [not] act in behalf of his principal” (emphasis added)); McRaith v. BDO
Seidman, LLP, 909 N.E.2d 310, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (explaining that the
exception “suspends the operation of the general rule when the circumstances
are such as to raise a clear presumption that the agent will not perform [his]
duty, and thus that the principal will not in fact receive and have the benefit of
the agent’s knowledge”). But see In re CBI Holding Co., 311 B.R. 350, 369–70
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding the adverse interest exception to be “entirely consistent
with the principles of agency law” because when the agent has totally
abandoned the interests of his principal the fiction of imputation is untenable).
26. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 11, at 315 (noting that “[i]t is not a defense
to a principal that an agent breached the agent’s duty to transmit relevant
information, even when the principal can establish that the agent withheld the
information” (emphasis added)); see also Andrew J. Morris, Clarifying the
Imputation Doctrine: Charging Audit Clients with Responsibility for
Unauthorized Audit Interference, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 350 (2001)
(noting that imputation’s primary purpose is to protect innocent third parties).
But see DeMott, supra note 11, at 316–17 (suggesting that imputation is
justified because “the internal relationship between the principal and the agent
shapes many dimensions of the agent’s interaction with the third party,” and
when the agent’s actions place him “outside the control structures put in place
by the principal,” the adverse interest exception makes sense).
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04(a) (2006). A second exception to
the adverse interest exception calls for imputation “when the principal has
ratified or knowingly retained a benefit from the agent’s action.” Id. § 5.04(b).
28. See Scordato, supra note 19, at 163 (noting that the extremely narrow
version of the adverse interest exception set out in the Restatement (Third) of
Agency is “as close to consistent with the risk allocation rationale as is possible
while still retaining an adverse agent exception”).
29. DeMott, supra note 11, at 319.
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application of the adverse interest exception when it would lead
to an unjust result. 30 These court-fashioned exceptions reveal
that imputation and the adverse interest exception are the wrong
tools for the job of addressing auditor liability.
a. The Sole Actor and Innocent Decision-Maker Exceptions
The two court-fashioned exceptions to the adverse interest
exception used in corporate fraud cases are the sole actor
exception and the innocent decision-maker exception. The sole
actor exception was created to defeat the adverse interest
exception when the agent is the sole representative of the
principal. 31 It provides that “if an agent is the sole representative
of a principal, then that agent’s fraudulent conduct is imputable
to the principal regardless of whether the agent’s conduct was
adverse to the principal’s interests.” 32 Courts reason that if the
corporation and the agent are one and the same, the agent has no
one to whom the agent can communicate knowledge, and the
adverse interest exception should not block imputation. 33
The innocent decision-maker exception carves back the sole
actor exception and prevents imputation when the corporation
has innocent decision-makers who could have stopped the fraud

30. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,
267 F.3d 340, 359 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that the court need not address the
adverse interest exception “because the ‘adverse interest exception’ is itself
subject to an exception—the ‘sole actor’ exception”); In re CBI Holding Co., 311
B.R. 350, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (defining the innocent insider, or innocent
decision-maker, exception).
31. See In re Jack Greenberg, Inc., 212 B.R. 76, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“Where
the officer in question is the sole representative of the corporation, there is no
one to whom to impart his or her knowledge and no one from whom to conceal
it.”).
32. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 359; see also In re Norvergence, Inc., 405 B.R. 709,
748 (D.N.J. 2009) (describing the sole actor exception to the adverse interest
exception).
33. See Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 528–29 (3d Cir. 2008) (recognizing
the sole actor exception but refusing to apply it when the plaintiffs owned only
65% of the corporation’s stock); In re CBI Holding Co., 311 B.R. at 373 (“[I]t
would be nonsensical to refrain from imputing the agent’s acts of fraud to the
corporation, despite the agent’s total abandonment of the corporation’s interests,
[when] the agent is identical to the corporation.”).
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had they discovered it. 34 The rationale behind this exception is
that
where only some members of management are guilty of the
misconduct, and the innocent members could and would have
prevented the misconduct had they known of it, the culpability
of the malefactors should not be imputed to the company
because that imputation would punish innocent insiders (e.g.,
non-culpable shareholders) unfairly. 35

These court-fashioned exceptions are not universally recognized
but have become part of the arsenal advocates use when arguing
for or against imputation. 36
b. Tests for the Adverse Interest Exception Vary by State
State law governs the common law of agency. 37 States have
widely accepted the adverse interest exception but articulate the
test for adverse action differently. 38 New York, for example, has
adopted a very narrow construction. 39 In New York, an agent
must “have totally abandoned his principal’s interests and be
34. See In re CBI Holding Co., 311 B.R. at 372 (defining the innocent
insider, or innocent decision-maker, exception); see also In re Am. Int’l Grp.,
Inc., Consol. Derivative Litig. (AIG II), 976 A.2d 872, 893 n.56 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(noting that in New York “there never actually was a freestanding innocent
insider exception, it was simply an exception to the so-called ‘sole actor rule’
which is itself an exception to the adverse interest exception”).
35. In re CBI Holding Co., 311 B.R. at 372.
36. See, e.g., Amelia Toy Rudolph, Invoking In Pari Delicto to Bar
Accountant Liability Actions Brought by Trustees and Receivers, SS009 ALIABA 547, 574 & 579 (2010) (noting that the sole actor exception has been widely
accepted but that more courts reject than accept the innocent decision-maker
exception).
37. See, e.g., O’Melveny & Myers v. F.D.I.C., 512 U.S. 79, 84–85 (1994)
(holding that in the FDIC receivership context “[state] law, not federal law,
governs the imputation of knowledge to corporate victims of alleged
negligence”).
38. See Rudolph, supra note 36, at 574–75 (citing fifty-four state and
federal cases applying the exception).
39. See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. (AIG I), 965 A.2d 763, 824 (Del. Ch.
2009) (noting that the adverse interest exception under New York law is “an
extremely narrow one”); see also id. at 825 (declining to adopt the innocent
insider exception in applying New York law because “the recent trend of New
York law has been strongly against [its] adoption”).
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acting entirely for his own or another’s purposes.” 40 The New
York Court of Appeals takes the position that “[s]o long as the
corporate wrongdoer’s fraudulent conduct enables the business to
survive—to attract investors and customers and raise funds for
corporate purposes—this test is not met.” 41 By contrast,
Pennsylvania takes a less-restrictive approach and articulates its
test this way:
Where an agent acts in his own interest which is antagonistic
to that of his principal, or commits a fraud for his own benefit
in a matter which is beyond the scope of his actual or apparent
authority or employment, the principal who has received no
benefit therefrom will not be liable for the agent’s tortious
act. 42

While Pennsylvania’s test is similar, Pennsylvania courts use a
different measure to determine whether a “benefit” has been
received by the principal. 43
What distinguishes the tests for the adverse interest
exception is the “degree of self-interest required, or, conversely,
the quantum of benefit to the corporation necessary to avoid the
exception’s application (where self-interest is evident).” 44 In
allowing any short-term benefit to defeat the exception, New York
has created a clear rule where virtually all corporate fraud will be
40. Center v. Hampton Affiliates, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 828, 900 (N.Y. 1985)
(emphasis added); see also Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 952 (N.Y.
2010) (noting that New York’s narrow scope for the adverse interest exception
defeats the presumption of communication when the corporation is “actually the
victim of a scheme undertaken by the agent to benefit himself” and is consistent
with fundamental principles of agency law).
41. Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 953 (citing Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 2006)).
42. Todd v. Skelly, 120 A.2d 906, 909 (Pa. 1956); see also AHERF, 989 A.2d
313, 336 (Pa. 2010) (citing Todd to provide Pennsylvania’s “traditional, liberal
test for corporate benefit”).
43. AHERF, 989 A.2d at 334 (“[W]e believe there is . . . difficulty with
applying too liberal a litmus for benefit, particularly in a paradigm involving
alleged collusion between the agent and the defendant.”).
44. Id.; see also Rudolph, supra note 36, at 564 (noting that courts
articulate the test for the adverse interest exception in various ways “with the
variations generally appearing to be the extent of the agent’s personal benefit or
motivation and the extent of the adversity to the corporation”). Rudolph further
notes that “the battleground is often whether the benefit from the alleged
wrongdoing must be exclusively for the agent (e.g., embezzlement) for
the . . . exception to apply.” Id.
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imputed to the corporation. 45 Other states have taken a harder
look at what constitutes a benefit and have refused to find one
where the corporation’s existence is “artificially prolonged”
through its officers’ fraud. 46
The adverse interest exception has the difficult charge of
avoiding the harsh result of imputation while not creating an
equally unjust outcome through its application. When a
corporation is tainted with fraud, imputation is essential to
protecting innocent third parties who were harmed by their
dealings with the corporation. 47 The adverse interest exception,
then, should not apply in most instances of corporate fraud. 48
Because imputation is essential to protecting those who
transact business with corporations, reliance on the adverse
interest exception by those attempting to defeat the in pari
delicto defense is misplaced. The exception’s failure in this
context is evidenced by (1) the court-fashioned exceptions to the
adverse interest exception—created to address the ever-present
case where strictly applying the adverse interest exception would
produce undesirable results 49—and (2) by the differing standards
45. Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 952 (noting that the exception is reserved for
cases of “outright theft or looting or embezzlement”).
46. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that
“prolonged artificial insolvency” is a “Pyrrhic benefit” which should not block the
adverse interest exception); In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 365 B.R. 24, 56
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“This Court is not of a mind to hold at this point in time, on
motion, that even a peppercorn of benefit to a corporation from the wrongful
conduct would provide total dispensation to defendants knowingly and
substantially assisting insider misconduct that is overwhelmingly adverse to the
corporation.”). The Seventh Circuit’s position in Schacht has been termed the
“deepening insolvency” rationale for finding an adverse interest. See, e.g.,
Matthew G. Dore, Presumed Innocent? Financial Institutions, Professional
Malpractice Claims, and Defenses Based on Management Misconduct, 1995
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 127, 156 (1995) (discussing the deepening insolvency
rationale).
47. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 954 (N.Y. 2010)
(“No one disputes that traditional imputation principles, including a narrowly
confined adverse interest exception, should remain unchanged—indeed, are
essential—in other contexts.”).
48. See id. (refusing to apply the adverse interest exception); see also
AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 333 (Pa. 2010) (noting that it would be a mistake to
apply the adverse interest exception too broadly in part because
“[i]mputation . . . serves to protect those who transact business with a
corporation through its agents”).
49. See, e.g., AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 884 (Del. Ch. 2009) (noting the “squishy
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of corporate benefit and self-interest that courts have created to
determine if the exception applies. 50
The adverse interest exception addresses a narrow set of
circumstances in which an agent’s acts are so contrary to her
proper role in the agency relationship that it would be manifestly
unfair to hold the principal responsible for them. 51 In the case of
corporate fraud, the fraudulent acts are contrary to the agent’s
duty to perform according to the law. 52 But they are not so far
removed from the agent’s role in the agency relationship that it
would be unfair to hold the corporation responsible to third
parties injured by their dealings with the agent. 53 The facts
relevant to determining if the adverse interest exception should
apply address the suitability of holding a principal legally
responsible for its agent’s dealings with third parties. These facts
do not inform whether a corporation should be permitted to
recover from its auditor for malpractice. This divergence has
historically been addressed through exceptions to a rule that does
not reach the underlying issue. 54 A better approach would
directly address whether the corporation should be able to
recover from its auditor for malpractice. 55
manner in which some courts have employed the in pari delicto doctrine” and
chiding the plaintiffs for asking the court to “find that th[e] case falls within
some ‘exception’ to the traditional application of the doctrine”); see also supra
Part II.A.1 (discussing the adverse interest exception, the sole actor exception,
and the innocent decision-maker exception).
50. See supra Part II.A.1.b (discussing the benefit and self-interest analysis
employed to determine applicability of the adverse interest exception).
51. See, e.g., In re CBI Holding Co., Inc., 311 B.R. 350, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(noting that “agency would fall into desuetude if imputation had no bounds”).
52. See AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 827 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[A]ny conscious act of a
fiduciary causing a corporation to break the law is against the corporation’s
charter and best interests.”).
53. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 951 (N.Y. 2010)
(discussing the importance of holding corporations responsible for the acts of
their agents and noting that “[a]gency law presumes imputation even where the
agent acts less than admirably, exhibits poor business judgment, or commits
fraud”).
54. See, e.g., id. at 954 (noting that the plaintiffs request that the adverse
interest exception be altered for purposes of the in pari delicto defense only
because a narrowly confined adverse interest exception is essential in other
contexts).
55. See infra Part IV (arguing that the availability of the in pari delicto
defense should not turn on imputation but that it should be available only if the

288

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275 (2012)
2. Third Parties Not Acting in Good Faith

In addition to using the adverse interest exception, courts
have defeated the in pari delicto defense by finding that when an
auditor is charged with fraud, agency law does not support
imputation. 56 There are two main reasons that an auditor should
not be permitted to invoke imputation when the third party does
not deal with the principal in good faith. First, when a third party
colludes with an agent who acts adversely to his principal, the
law does not maintain the presumption that the agent will
communicate his knowledge to the principal. 57 This is the adverse
interest exception to imputation discussed previously. 58 But
consider this scenario: an agent secretly colludes with a third
party to perform an act that is not deemed “adverse” to his
organizational principal. For example, when an officer secretly
misstates the financials of a corporation, this fraud may be
considered a benefit to the corporation rather than an adverse
act. 59 The adverse interest exception will not apply, but its
rationale operates with equal force to vitiate the presumption
that the agent will communicate with his principal. 60 When the
agent and the third party are colluding in a way that is kept
secret from the principal—even though the act is not considered
“adverse” under applicable state law—the third party is certain

corporation can meaningfully be deemed a wrongdoer).
56. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b (2006) (“If the
third party colludes with the agent against the principal or otherwise knows or
has reason to know that the agent is acting adversely to the principal, the third
party should not expect that the agent will fulfill duties of disclosure owed to the
principal.”).
57. See id. § 5.03 cmt. b (noting that notwithstanding the adverse interest
exception to imputation, an agent’s knowledge is imputed “when necessary to
protect the rights of a third party who dealt with the principal in good faith”)
(emphasis added).
58. See supra Part II.A.1 for more detail on the adverse interest exception.
59. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 953 (N.Y. 2010) (“So
long as the corporate wrongdoer’s fraudulent conduct enables the business to
survive—to attract investors and customers and raise funds for corporate
purposes—this test [for adverse action rather than corporate benefit] is not
met.”).
60. But see supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the divergence
of the adverse interest expectation from the rationale for imputation).
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the agent will not communicate the knowledge to the principal
and the fiction of imputation should not be maintained. 61
Second, for an agency relationship to exist the agent must
have authority to bind the principal. 62 This comes in the form of
actual authority or apparent authority. 63 An agent has actual
authority when the principal has expressly given the agent
authority to act on its behalf, or when the agent reasonably
believes that he has authority to act on its behalf. 64 Apparent
authority exists when a third party reasonably believes the agent
has the authority to act on behalf of the principal. 65
An agent who colludes with a third party to secretly commit
fraud—even for the benefit of his principal—acts with neither
actual nor apparent authority. 66 The agent himself does not
believe that “the principal wishes [him] so to act.” 67 This is
evidenced by the secretive nature of his actions. 68 Similarly, no
apparent authority exists because the collusive third party knows
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b (2006) (“[I]mputation
protects innocent third parties but not those who know or have reason to know
that an agent is not likely to transmit material information to the principal.”).
62. See id. intro. note (“[T]he three distinct bases on which the common law
of agency attributes the legal consequences of one person’s action to another
person . . . are actual authority, apparent authority, and respondeat superior.”).
63. Id.
64. See id. § 2.01 (“An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of
taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably
believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the
principal wishes the agent so to act.”); see also id. cmt b (defining express actual
authority and implied actual authority).
65. See id. § 2.03 (“Apparent authority is the power held by an agent or
other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third
party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the
principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”).
66. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 336 (Pa. 2010) (noting that, when an
agent and third party collude, “the agent’s authority is neither actual nor
apparent” because “both the agent and the third party know very well that the
agent’s conduct goes unsanctioned by one or more of the tiers of corporate
governance”); cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining
Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 650 (2010) (“For a
corporate director knowingly to cause the corporation to engage in unlawful acts
or activities or enter an unlawful business is disloyal in the most fundamental of
senses.”).
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006).
68. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d at 337 (“Imputation is not justified in
scenarios involving secretive, collusive activity . . . .”).
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that the secretive actions are not authorized. 69 Imputation, which
only applies to an agency relationship, is not applicable when one
of “the three distinct bases on which the common law of agency
attributes the legal consequences of one person’s action to
another person” is not present. 70
Understanding when imputation and the adverse exception
apply is essential to examining how courts have traditionally
approached auditor liability in corporate fraud cases. 71 These
principles may also be important to other defenses an auditor can
raise such as inability to prove causation in a fraud claim. 72 The
role that imputation may play in other contexts, and the
desirability of precluding auditors as a class from invoking
imputation, however, are beyond the scope of this Note. 73 Here,
69. Id.
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY intro. note (2006).
71. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d at 333 (noting that “agency law plays a
pivotal role in the [in pari delicto] defense’s practical availability” because
attribution of the officers’ misconduct to the corporation is a linchpin to the
defendant auditor’s ability to raise the defense).
72. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1346 n.2 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting
that a defendant can use imputation for a claim of estoppel or the inability to
prove causation in a fraud claim). For example, in Cenco Inc. v. Seidman &
Seidman, discussed infra Part II.C.1, the plaintiffs brought claims against the
corporation’s auditor for breach of contract, professional malpractice, and fraud.
The court analyzed the three claims as a “single form of wrongdoing under
different names.” Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 453 (7th Cir.
1982). The court noted that “a participant in a fraud cannot also be a victim
entitled to recover damages, for he cannot have relied on the truth of the
fraudulent representations, and such reliance is an essential element in a case
of fraud.” Id. at 454. This approach is arguably incorrect. See AIG I, 965 A.2d
763, 826 (Del. Ch. 2009) (criticizing Cenco for “blithely” taking the same position
as to claims for negligent conduct and intentional conduct and for finding that
all claims were governed by one defense). The approach to each claim should be
distinct: An auditor (1) may not invoke imputation when charged with fraud but
may seek to prove that the corporation itself was at fault and invoke the in pari
delicto defense, and (2) may impute a fraudulent agent’s knowledge to the
corporation when faced with a claim of breach of contract or negligence but
imputation would not necessarily be relevant to the auditor’s defense against
these claims. See infra Part IV (arguing that a plaintiff corporation’s actions
should be judged by the acts of the corporation, not simply by imputing the
wrongdoing of one agent to the corporation).
73. But see infra Part II.C.5.b for a brief discussion of Chancellor Strine’s
argument that auditors should be treated like corporate insiders and precluded
from invoking imputation when the corporation brings suit against them for
their wrongdoing.
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the focus rests on considering how courts’ traditional approach to
auditor malpractice—combining imputation with the in pari
delicto defense to bar suit—may be flawed.
B. In Pari Delicto
1. Defined
In pari delicto is an affirmative defense 74 which provides that
when a plaintiff and defendant stand in a position of equal or
mutual fault, the position of the defendant is the better one. 75
The defense is the “counterpart legal doctrine to [the equitable
defense] of unclean hands.” 76 Some courts have used the legal and
equitable doctrines “interchangeably without discussion of any
difference between them,” 77 while others have drawn a distinction
between the defense brought at law and in equity. 78 Beyond the
74. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,
267 F.3d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 2001) (classifying in pari delicto as an affirmative
defense). The Second Circuit characterizes in pari delicto as a matter of
standing. See, e.g., Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114,
120 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the bankruptcy trustee lacked standing because
a “claim against a third party for defrauding a corporation with the cooperation
of management accrues to creditors, not to the guilty corporation”); see also
Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that in the
corporate fraud context where the “trustee stands in the shoes of the
corporation, the Wagoner rule bars a trustee from suing to recover for a wrong
that he himself essentially took part in”). This outlier position, known as the
Wagoner Rule, does not change the analysis here and will not be mentioned
further in this Note.
75. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299,
306 (1985) (“In a case of equal or mutual fault . . . the position of the [defending]
party . . . is the better one.”).
76. Byron v. Clay, 867 F.2d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1989).
77. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-Merger
Justification of Unclean Hands, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 455, 482–83 (2008) (citing New
York and Maryland cases); see also id. at 468–74 (surveying the different uses of
the doctrines among states and in federal courts and arguing for the death of
the distinction between the legal and equitable defenses).
78. See AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 328 n.16 (Pa. 2010) (noting that a previous
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision which applied the unclean hands doctrine
to a case brought in equity could not “fully answer the question of how in pari
delicto should function with regard to claims substantively grounded at law”).
But see id. at 328 (recognizing that in pari delicto has “surmounted its moorings
in strict equity jurisprudence and transitioned into a defense in actions at law”
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law–equity distinction, the defense is complicated by different
standards under federal law and state law—where the standards
further diverge by state. 79
From this background, however, the doctrine can be
presented in three general principles. First, the plaintiff’s
responsibility must be substantially equal to or greater than the
defendant’s. 80 Second, the illegal activity that the plaintiff
engaged in must be the subject of the lawsuit. 81 And third, even
where these conditions are present, public policy considerations
can defeat the defense. 82 Unavoidable, then, is the recognition
that the defense is “judicial implementation of social policy.” 83

in many jurisdictions including Pennsylvania).
79. See, e.g., Rudolph, supra note 36, at 574–77 (presenting different
articulations of the standard under federal law and state law).
80. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d at 329 n.19 (noting that for the defense to
apply in Pennsylvania the parties must either have relatively equal degrees of
fault or the plaintiff’s fault must be clearly greater). But see Bateman, 472 U.S.
at 307 (noting that “many courts have given the in pari delicto defense a broad
application to bar actions where plaintiffs simply have been involved generally
in the same sort of wrong-doing as defendants” (citations omitted)); AIG II, 976
A.2d 872, 883–84 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“Although the literal translation of in pari
delicto is ‘in equal fault,’ the doctrine does not require that a court engage in the
type of accounting that in pari delicto is meant to avoid . . . .”).
81. See, e.g., McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 757 (3d
Cir. 1990) (“[I]n order to bar recovery, the plaintiff must be an active, voluntary
participant in the unlawful activity that is the subject of the suit.”).
82. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299,
307 (1985) (“In addition, the public policy considerations that undergirded the in
pari delicto defense were frequently construed as precluding the defense even
where the plaintiff bore substantial fault for his injury.” (citations omitted));
AHERF, 989 A.2d at 330 (“[T]he roots of the defense in equity
jurisprudence . . . undermines [defendant’s] contention that in pari delicto is to
be woodenly applied . . . .”); cf. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1349 (7th Cir.
1983) (reaching its conclusion in part because “permitting recovery in this case
would not send unqualified signals to shareholders that they need not be alert to
managerial fraud since they may later recover full indemnification for that
fraud” (emphasis added)); id. at 1349 n.5 (referring to the outcome in Cenco as
“the deterrence policy of Cenco”); NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871,
881 (N.J. 2006) (“[An] auditor should not be able to avoid responsibility for its
own misdeeds because imputation ‘is invocable to protect the innocent, never to
promote an injustice.’” (quoting Nischne v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 173 A.
341, 342 (N.J. Ch. 1934))).
83. AHERF, 989 A.2d at 331.
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Judicial discretion, though, is consistent with in pari delicto’s
roots in equity. 84 Courts should not apply the defense “woodenly”
when other considerations trump the policy basis for the doctrine
itself. 85 And it follows that the doctrine should not be used in a
way that does not promote the policy considerations for which it
was created. In pari delicto is intended to prevent a wrongdoer
from profiting from his own misconduct. 86 The plaintiff must be a
wrongdoer to achieve the “important public policy purposes” that
have placed the doctrine “in the inmost texture of our common
law for at least two centuries.” 87 Courts should reconsider if
imputation carries the burden of making the corporation a
wrongdoer. In fact, persuasive case law cautions against
combining imputation with in pari delicto to bar a claim. 88
2. In Pari Delicto Applied in Conjunction with Imputation
In applying in pari delicto, recent cases have glossed over the
doctrine as well-settled law that does not require close
examination. 89 But the application of in pari delicto in
84. See, e.g., Anenson, supra note 77, at 482 (noting that “the doctrine of in
pari delicto serves such diverse purposes as preserving the dignity of the courts,
expressing a moral principle, and enforcing public policy”); see also id. (noting
that in pari delicto was first applied by Lord Mansfield who was overheard
commenting that he “never liked law so much as when it resembled equity”
(citations omitted)). But see Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925,
939 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring) (“The time when equity relief really
was discretionary—a judgment committed to the conscience of the chancellor—
is past, the law of equity having long ago crystallized in a system of rules
similar in basic character to the rules of the common law, though perhaps
marginally more flexible.”).
85. AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 330 (Pa. 2010).
86. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010)
(“[T]he principle that a wrongdoer should not profit from his own misconduct is
so strong in New York that we have said the defense applies even in difficult
cases . . . .”).
87. Id. (noting that in pari delicto serves the purposes of denying judicial
relief to an admitted wrongdoer and avoiding entangling courts in disputes
between wrongdoers).
88. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 10 (citing opinions by Judge Learned
Hand and Judge Richard Posner that decline to apply in pari delicto).
89. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d at 328 (“The Latin derivation and equitable
origins of the underlying common-law maxim [of in pari delicto] have been well
traveled and need not be revisited at length here.”); see also cases discussed
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conjunction with imputation against corporate plaintiffs is
fundamentally different than its application against the actual
wrongdoer. 90 There is a leap in logic from holding a corporation
legally responsible for the acts of its agent through imputation to
classifying it as a wrongdoer who may not bring a claim before
the court. 91
Consider the case of a plaintiff who is a natural person. If a
defendant wishes to raise the defense of in pari delicto, he bears
the burden of proving that the plaintiff bears substantially equal
or greater responsibility for the underlying illegality. 92 When that
plaintiff is a principal in an agency relationship, the acts of an
agent will not satisfy this requirement. This is because, as Judge
Learned Hand declared, “immoral conduct[,] to be relevant, must
touch and taint the plaintiff personally; . . . the acts of his agents,
though imputed to him legally, do not impugn his conscience
vicariously.” 93
In other contexts, courts have set a high standard for a
defendant to show that the plaintiff was at equal fault. For
example, the Supreme Court, in a securities fraud case, held that
a tippee, while guilty of fraud, is not culpable enough for a tipper
broker-dealer to raise the in pari delicto defense. 94
infra Part II.C (discussing three recent influential cases which apply in pari
delicto with little discussion of the defense).
90. See Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 13
(Pa. 1968) (finding that a corporate plaintiff was not barred from bringing suit
when its officer had committed a wrong because “attribution of one party’s
unclean hands to another party is not based on simple agency principles”).
91. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006) (“For purposes
of determining a principal’s legal relations with a third party, notice of a fact
that an agent knows or has reason to know is imputed to the principal . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
92. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 329 n.19 (Pa. 2010) (noting that some
courts have dispensed with the strict requirement that the plaintiff bear equal
or greater responsibility for the harm).
93. Art Metal Works v. Abraham & Straus, 70 F.2d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 1934)
(Hand, J., dissenting), adopted as opinion of the court on r’hrg, 107 F.2d 944,
944 (2d Cir. 1934).
94. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 314
(1985) (“Absent other culpable actions by a tippee that can fairly be said to
outweigh these violations by insiders and broker-dealers, we do not believe that
the tippee properly can be characterized as being of substantially equal
culpability as his tippers.”).
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This issue is illuminated in the corporate fraud context
where the plaintiff is a bankruptcy trustee 95 or receiver. 96 Here,
the wrongdoer has been removed from the scene and the plaintiff
before the court is an innocent party. 97 In these cases, courts
often deny use of the defense because it leads to an unjust
result. 98 Courts that allow the defense are more likely to do so
against a bankruptcy trustee. 99 This is because they feel bound by
federal bankruptcy law 100 to apply any defense that would have
been available against the bankrupt party to the trustee. 101
95. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,
267 F.3d 340, 358 (3d Cir. 2001) (joining the Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits
in applying in pari delicto to bar claims of a bankruptcy trustee without regard
to the trustee’s status as an innocent successor).
96. See F.D.I.C. v. O’Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1995)
(noting that “defenses based on a party’s unclean hands or inequitable conduct
do not generally apply against that party’s receiver”). The Ninth Circuit would
also deny in pari delicto against a bankruptcy trustee. See id. (noting that a
bankruptcy trustee is one category of receiver against whom in pari delicto
would not apply); see also Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 358 (distinguishing prior cases
that declined to apply in pari delicto in the receivership context from the
present case, which involved a bankruptcy trustee, because “unlike bankruptcy
trustees, receivers are not subject of the limits of section 541”).
97. See, e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The
appointment of the receiver removed the wrongdoer from the scene. The
corporations were no more Douglas’s evil zombies. Freed from his spell they
became entitled to the return of the moneys—for the benefit not of Douglas but
of innocent investors . . . .”).
98. See, e.g., McRaith v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 909 N.E.2d 310, 336 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2009) (finding defendant’s attempt to equate the liquidator of an insolvent
insurance company with the company’s wrongdoing officer to be “illogical and
unavailing” because “the Liquidator, by statutory definition, is not the
wrongdoer”).
99. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 358 (noting that “[w]hile bankruptcy law
mandates that the trustee step into the shoes of the debtor when asserting
causes of action, state law generally provides the substantive law governing
imputation for state law claims”).
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006) (stating that a bankruptcy estate includes
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case”).
101. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267
F.3d 340, 357 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The plain language of section 541, however,
prevents courts from taking into account events that occur after the
commencement of the bankruptcy case. As a result, we must evaluate the in
pari delicto defense without regard to whether the Committee is an innocent
successor.”); see also In re the Pers. and Bus. Ins. Agency, 334 F.3d 239, 246 (3d
Cir. 2003) (finding that because “[t]here is no limiting language in § 548 similar
to that in § 541,” there is no reason not to follow the “better rule” not to impute
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But in pari delicto should not, in the first instance, be an
available defense against a corporation based solely on the
corporation being imputed with the wrongful acts of its agents. 102
Whether federal or state law applies, a corporation’s legal
responsibility for the acts of its agents is not identical to the label
of “wrongdoer” which would invite the in pari delicto defense. 103
C. Case Law
1. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman
Several courts have recently considered how to address
auditor liability in corporate fraud cases using the principles of
imputation and in pari delicto. Before turning to recent cases, it
will be informative to first consider the case that provides the
foundation for auditor liability in corporate fraud cases. The
Seventh Circuit case Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman104 led to a
“pioneering decision” in the area of corporate auditor liability. 105
the agent’s conduct when it would lead to an inequitable result). But see In re
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 365 B.R. 24, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (criticizing Lafferty’s
analysis of § 541 and suggesting that § 541 is only relevant to ownership of a
cause of action and standing to assert it, not to defenses that can properly be
asserted against those causes of action).
102. See infra Part IV (arguing that a plaintiff corporation’s actions should
be judged by the acts of the corporation, not simply by imputing the wrongdoing
of one agent to the corporation).
103. See Art Metal Works v. Abraham & Straus, 70 F.2d 641, 646 (2d Cir.
1934) (Hand, J., dissenting), adopted as opinion of the court on r’hrg, 107 F.2d
944, 944 (2d Cir. 1934) (“It would be monstrous that a man’s conscience should
bear the sins of those he employs, however liable he may be for their acts, and a
doctrine which stands upon moral wrongdoing must clear itself of that
confusion, or adopt another form.”); see also Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750,
754 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that “the defense of in pari delicto loses its sting
when the person who is in pari delicto is eliminated”); Universal Builders, Inc.
v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. 1968) (declining to apply in pari
delicto when the wrongdoing was done by an officer of the now-bankrupt
plaintiff corporation because “[t]he attribution of one party’s clean hands to
another party is not based on simple agency principles”).
104. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982)
(holding that the allegedly negligent auditors could invoke imputation as a
defense when corporate management committed fraud on behalf of the
corporation).
105. AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 331 (Pa. 2010).
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It set the stage for a strict application of the in pari delicto
defense and has served as the foundation for many similar
outcomes. 106 Cenco has, however, been criticized for its simplistic
approach to the complex intersection of law, policy, and equity. 107
It was undoubtedly a decision (1) highly driven by the specific
facts before the court 108 and (2) reached by a court with specific
policy goals in mind. 109 The Seventh Circuit’s decision one year
later in Schacht v. Brown 110 clarifies how these factors limit the
holding in Cenco.
First, a brief look at the facts of Cenco. Over the course of five
years, Cenco managers inflated inventory values to make the
company appear more valuable, which in turn increased the price
of its stock. 111 The company’s apparently strong position allowed
it to buy up other companies “on the cheap” and borrow money at
106. See, e.g., Dore, supra note 46, at 161 (noting the courts that have
expressly or implicitly followed Cenco); see also In re CBI Holding Co., Inc., 311
B.R. 350, 370 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Cenco suggests that courts should focus on
who bore the ‘primary costs’ of the fraud—stockholders, or outsiders to the
corporation—rather than on the purpose behind the fraud.”); Kirschner v.
KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 952 (N.Y. 2010) (noting that the Second Circuit’s
approach to in pari delicto is “heavily influenced by” Cenco).
107. See AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 826 & n.241 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that
Cenco simplifies complexities with “articulation[s] [that] ignore[] all nuance and
several alternatives to avoiding an unreasonably harsh treatment of the
auditors”); AHERF, 989 A.2d at 331–32 (discussing critique of Cenco and
holding that Pennsylvania law does not accord with the notion that
incentivizing internal corporate monitoring should take priority “over the
objectives of the traditional schemes governing liability in contract and in tort”);
Andrew J. Morris, Some Challenges for Legal Pragmatism, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
1, 18–41 (criticizing Cenco for its reliance on highly abstract principles and
pragmatic reasoning to create new law after being hasty in its determination
that no existing case law provided guidance).
108. See Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456 (declining to rule that an auditor is never
liable for the frauds of its employees, but finding that on the uncontested facts of
this case the corporation should not be allowed to shift the entire responsibility
for the fraud to its auditors).
109. See id. at 455 (“In predicting how the Illinois courts might decide the
present case, we assume they would be guided by the underlying objectives of
tort liability. Those objectives are to compensate the victims of wrongdoing and
to deter future wrongdoing.”).
110. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1347 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
plaintiff’s complaint adequately stated a claim under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act and that the claim was not defeated by Cenco).
111. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir.
1982) (presenting the facts of the case).
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low rates. 112 The fraud was eventually discovered and led to a
class action suit by Cenco stockholders against Cenco, its corrupt
managers, and its auditor Seidman & Seidman (Seidman). 113 The
class of stock purchasers settled with Seidman, leaving before the
court the cross-claims by Cenco and Seidman. 114 Cenco alleged
that Seidman was liable to it for failing to prevent the fraud, and
Seidman alleged that it was a victim of the fraud and thus
entitled to damages. 115
The court found for Seidman because the fraudulent acts of
Cenco’s managers, which were done on behalf of the corporation,
were attributable to Cenco. 116 Judge Posner declared: “Fraud on
behalf of a corporation is not the same thing as fraud against
it.” 117 In this case, the stockholders had received a benefit from
the fraud and outsiders had borne the primary costs. Judge
Posner was not willing to allow stockholders to escape all
responsibility for the fraud. 118
This famous language from Cenco has been used to foreclose
suits against an auditor brought by or on behalf of a fraudulent
corporation. 119 But the decision is not always considered in light
of the Seventh Circuit’s clarification in Schacht. 120 The Schacht
court advised that three important factors existed in Cenco:
(1) the shareholders who would benefit from a successful recovery
were the corrupt officers themselves, 121 (2) the plaintiffs would
possibly receive a double recovery after a previous successful
recovery in a direct suit against the defendants, 122 and
(3) deterrence would not be furthered by a holding for the
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 456.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See cases cited supra note 106 (citing cases that have followed Cenco to
prevent plaintiffs’ recovery from the corporation’s auditor).
120. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1347 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that
Cenco’s “underlying policy [does not] forbid[] the Director from maintaining the
present action” (emphasis added)).
121. Id. at 1348.
122. Id. at 1349.
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plaintiffs because (i) the directors would recover as shareholders
and (ii) large corporate shareholders had been in a position to
police the plaintiff’s corrupt officers. 123
Without facts that would lead to compensating
wrongdoers, 124 and when deterring wrongdoing required the
opposite result, 125 the Schacht court adhered to the guiding
principles of tort liability to abandon the outcome that had
furthered these principles under the facts of Cenco. 126 Different
facts required a different result.
Of course, different law applied as well. 127 In Cenco, the court
was predicting how Illinois courts would decide the issue under
Illinois common law and in Schacht the court applied a federal
statute and was able to “bring to bear federal policies in deciding
the estoppel question.” 128 But no federal policies were advanced to
justify a different outcome. In fact, the court proceeded by
123. Id.
124. See id. at 1348. Unlike the wrongdoing-shareholder plaintiffs in Cenco,
the plaintiffs first in line to recover in Schacht were policyholders and creditors;
shareholders were last in line to recover. See id. (noting that “under the
distribution provisions of the governing liquidation statute, it is the
policyholders and creditors who have first claim”).
125. See id. at 1349 (“There is also no evidence here of the existence of large
corporate shareholders capable of conducting an independent audit, as in Cenco,
and whose lack of investigatory zeal would be rewarded by a decision favorable
to the [plaintiff].”)
126. See id. at 1348 (finding that a “Cenco-type analysis” would not yield the
results defendants urged).
127. See
id.
at
1347
(noting
that
the
Cenco
court
was
“merely . . . attempt[ing] to divine how Illinois courts would decide th[e] issue,”
but that the present cause of action arose under a federal statute giving the
court a clean slate on which to write).
128. Id. The court addressed the issue as one of estoppel. See id. at 1346
(presenting defendants’ argument that plaintiff should be estopped from
proceeding because he stood in the shoes of a corporation imputed with its
officers’ and directors’ illegal conduct); see also Integrity Ins. Co. v. Yegen
Holdings Corp. (In re Integrity), 573 A.2d 928, 941–42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1990) (“[E]ven though an agent (the directors and officers) of a principal
(Integrity) may be responsible for falsity, the third party’s ([the auditor])
culpability, if established, would estop it from raising the defense of
imputation.”). While this Note focuses on the defense of in pari delicto, a
plaintiff imputed with the fraud of corporate officers invites other defenses such
as estoppel, or inability to prove causation under a fraud claim. See Schacht v.
Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1346 n.2 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that an estoppel defense
or the inability to prove causation in a fraud claim “raise the same issue”). See
supra note 72 for further discussion on this point.
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analyzing the issue “[as] if the estoppel holding in Cenco were
relevant.” 129
The distinction between the fraudulent acts in Schacht and
those in Cenco is a thin one. In Cenco, “those involved in the
fraud were not stealing from the company, as in the usual
corporate fraud case, but were instead aggrandizing the company
(and themselves) at the expense of outsiders.” 130 This was fraud
on behalf of the corporation. In Schacht, by contrast, the
directors’ fraudulent action pushed the corporation past its point
of insolvency and systematically looted its most profitable
business, aggravating its insolvency. 131 This, according to the
court, is not a benefit to the corporation. 132 The court found that
“it defies common sense to suggest that a parent corporation’s
shareholders are not injured when their directors fraudulently
prop up, drain, and thereby deepen the insolvency of a subsidiary
for whose liabilities the shareholders will eventually be liable.” 133
The difference seems slight—as the shareholders in both
instances will ultimately suffer 134—and not one on which the
decision to insulate auditors from liability should turn. The key to
reconciling the two cases and, more importantly, to gleaning a
rule from them, is to recognize that the Cenco decision was driven
by the court’s desire to effectuate the two underlying objectives of
tort liability: (1) to compensate victims and (2) to deter future
wrongdoing. 135
129. Id. at 1348 (“[E]ven if a Cenco-type analysis were applied to the instant
case . . . it would not yield the result that defendants urge, i.e., estoppel of the
Director based on the imputation to Reserve of the directors’ knowledge of
fraud.”).
130. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1982).
131. See Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1347–48 (contrasting the Cenco facts to those
of the instant case).
132. See id. at 1348 (“In no way can these results be described as beneficial
to Reserve.”).
133. Id. at 1348 n.4.
134. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 955 (N.Y. 2010)
(noting that “a company victimized by fraud is always likely to suffer long-term
harm once the fraud becomes known” (emphasis added)).
135. See Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455 (“Th[e] objectives [of tort liability] are to
compensate the victims of wrongdoing and to deter future wrongdoing.”); see
also Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1983) (“In Cenco we
undertook a two-pronged analysis to determine whether such imputation should
occur: whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff corporation would properly
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This is important for two reasons. First, to the extent a court
follows Cenco and strives to compensate victims and deter future
wrongdoing, its outcome will be uniquely fact dependent. 136 And
second, courts have failed to apply this Cenco “approach” to the
facts at hand but rather have broadly applied its holding without
the underlying tort-liability-objectives analysis. 137 In many cases,
this has led to auditors being insulated from liability. 138
Assuredly not all of these cases produced the wrong result, but to
the extent that the Cenco decision created a monster, its actual
lesson should be reconsidered.
2. New Jersey
The New Jersey Supreme Court did just that in NCP
Litigation Trust v. KPMG. 139 Here, a trust, on behalf of NCP
creditors and shareholders, brought a negligence claim against
KPMG for failure to perform its audits in conformity with GAAS
and GAAP 140 standards. 141 The court held that the in pari delicto
defense 142 is not available to one who “contributed to” the
compensate the victims of the wrongdoing, and whether such recovery would
deter future wrongdoing.”).
136. See, e.g., Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1348–49 (allowing the plaintiff’s claim to
proceed under slightly different facts than Cenco because application of the
compensation and deterrence principles did not bar suit).
137. See, e.g., Dore, supra note 46, at 143 (noting that the Fifth Circuit in
F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992), “adopts Cenco’s benefit
test to resolve imputation and adverse interest problems without evaluating
Judge Posner’s underlying rationale for the test: its alleged consistency with tort
law’s twin goals of compensation and deterrence”); see also cases cited supra
note 106 (citing cases that have followed Cenco).
138. See, e.g., AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 779 (Del. Ch. 2009) (noting that New
York law immunizes auditors from suit).
139. NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 873 (N.J. 2006) (holding
that the imputation doctrine does not bar corporate shareholders from
recovering through a litigation trust against an auditor who was negligent in
failing to uncover the fraud of corporate officers or directors).
140. See id. at 876 (defining GAAS (General Accepted Auditing Standards)
and GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) as the professional
guidelines that auditors must adhere to while conducting an audit).
141. See id. (presenting the allegations).
142. See id. at 879–80 (presenting the imputation doctrine and its rationale).
The New Jersey Supreme Court does not use the term in pari delicto but refers
to the defense as the “imputation defense.” Id. The court’s analysis of whether
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fraud. 143 Because the auditor in the case at bar was allegedly
negligent, it met this standard and was precluded from imputing
to the corporation (on whose behalf the plaintiffs brought suit)
the fraudulent acts of the corporation’s agents. 144
In reaching this decision, the court declined to follow Cenco
for three main reasons. First, Cenco applied Illinois law so the
court was “writ[ing] on a clean slate in addressing the issue
under New Jersey law.” 145 Second, the court considered how
Schacht narrowed Cenco’s holding. 146 Lastly, the court found that
barring all shareholders from recovery for the impropriety of
some shareholders is “unfair and improper.” 147
There are three groups of plaintiffs for whom the court found
that barring suit would not be unfair: (1) those shareholders who
engaged in the fraud, (2) those shareholders who knew or should
have known fraud was taking place, and (3) those who own large
blocks of stock and therefore arguably possess the ability to
oversee the company operations. 148 For these plaintiffs,
imputation should be applied and suit against an outside auditor
should be barred. 149
The court supplied two reasons why innocent shareholders
should be allowed to bring suit against negligent auditors. First,
the defendant may invoke imputation tracks an analysis of when to apply in
pari delicto and has been cited in this context. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d 313,
335 (Pa. 2010) (noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in NCP
“effectively negat[ed] imputation (and thus barr[ed] the in pari delicto defense)”
in the negligent-auditor context); see also Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 528
(3d Cir. 2008) (equating New Jersey’s “imputation defense” with in pari delicto);
In re Norvergence, Inc., 405 B.R. 709, 745–46 (D.N.J. 2009) (noting plaintiff’s
argument that under New Jersey law “the imputation defense (and therefore
the in pari delicto defense) cannot be asserted by the [defendant auditors]”).
143. See NCP Litig. Trust, 901 A.2d at 882 (“In sum, we hold that the
Trust’s suit is not barred because one who contributed to the misconduct cannot
invoke imputation.”).
144. See id. at 881–82 (noting that the New Jersey decision which
articulated the “contributed to” standard “drew no distinction between negligent
conduct on the one hand and fraudulent conduct on the other”).
145. Id. at 885.
146. Id. at 884–85.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 885–86.
149. See id. at 886 (stating that the holding with these limitations “properly
effectuate[s] the tort principle of compensating the victims of wrongdoing by
allowing only ‘innocent’ shareholders to recover”).
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“the nature of today’s corporations” makes it unlikely that the
shareholders of large corporations are in a position to monitor the
actions of corporate officials. 150 Second, auditors are specifically
retained to monitor corporate activity and the law must seek to
deter auditor wrongdoing. 151
The court also addressed the distinction between an agent’s
act which is “adverse to” or “for the benefit of” the corporation.
The court noted that “there can be difficulty in differentiating
between whether the malfeasant conduct benefits or harms the
corporation.” 152 But the court found that fraudulent acts of highranking officers which carry the business past the point of
insolvency cannot be considered a benefit to the corporation. 153
Lastly, the court noted that New Jersey is a comparative
negligence state so the corporation and its shareholders retain
good reason to carefully monitor the transactions of the
corporation and its management. 154
3. Pennsylvania
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed the
intersection of imputation and the in pari delicto defense in the
context of a claim by a committee of creditors (the Committee)
against a bankrupt corporation’s auditor. 155 The Committee
150. See id. (disagreeing with Cenco that imputation must be applied to
deter future wrongdoing).
151. See id. (“[O]ur focus cannot be limited only to deterring wrongdoing on
the part of corporate shareholders.”).
152. See id. at 887–88 (citing Debra A. Winiarsky, Litigating an
Accountant’s Liability Suit—Contributory Negligence and Third Party Practice,
SC46 A.L.I.-A.B.A 315, 326 (1998), who proposes that “almost any situation
involving management fraud can be seen as either aimed at harming or
benefitting the company”).
153. Id.
154. Id. The court suggests that any benefit the corporation received from its
agent’s fraud should not be a complete bar to liability but “only a factor in
apportioning damages.” Id.
155. See AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 339 (Pa. 2010) (holding that Pennsylvania
will recognize the in pari delicto defense in the negligent-auditor context, but
that imputation is unavailable to an auditor who has not proceeded in material
good faith by colluding with the agent to fraudulently misstate corporate
finances).
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alleged that the auditors colluded with company officials to
fraudulently misstate financials. 156 Specifically, the court
addressed the following issue certified to it by the Third Circuit:
should corporate officers’ knowledge of alleged fraud and
complicity be imputed to the corporation, “thereby exposing it to
an application of the in pari delicto doctrine and/or other defenses
which might arise . . . against an active wrongdoer proceeding
volitionally.” 157
In analyzing whether the officers’ knowledge should be
imputed to the corporation, the court examined the adverse
interest exception. It noted that the controversy surrounding the
appropriate application of the adverse interest exception has
focused on either (1) the degree of self-interest required, or (2) the
quantum of benefit to the corporation necessary to avoid the
exception’s application (where self-interest is evident). 158 The
court rejected these approaches and instead found that the
appropriate approach to benefit and self-interest is to consider
them in relation to the underlying purpose of imputation—fair
risk allocation. 159 The corporation should initially bear the risk of
any wrongdoing by its agents because it selects the agents and
implements procedures for monitoring them. 160 Innocent third
parties must be protected when they deal with a corporation’s
agent. 161

156. See
id.
at
315
(presenting
the
allegations
against
PricewaterhouseCooper).
157. Id. at 333.
158. Id. at 334.
159. See id. at 335 (“In light of the competing concerns, the appropriate
approach to benefit and self-interest is best related back to the underlying
purpose of imputation which is fair risk-allocation . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. c (2006) (“It is helpful to view questions about
imputation from the perspective of risk assumption, taking into account the
posture of the third party whose legal relations with the principal are at issue.”).
160. See AHERF, 989 A.2d at 333 (“[I]t is the principal who has selected and
delegated responsibility to . . . agents; accordingly, the [imputation] doctrine
creates incentives for the principal to do so carefully and responsibly.”); id. at
336 (“[I]mputation rules justly operate to protect third parties on account of
their reliance on an agent’s actual or apparent authority.”).
161. See id. at 333 (“Imputation . . . serves to protect those who transact
business with a corporation through its agents believing the agent’s conduct is
with the authority of the principal.”).
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But when the third party is on notice that the agent is acting
adversely to the corporation and will not share his knowledge
with the corporation, the third party no longer merits the
protection that imputation provides. 162 In this regard, the court
found that the appropriate distinction is between those who dealt
with the company in material good faith and those who did not. 163
a. Those Who Proceed in Good Faith
The court held that the in pari delicto defense is available in
the negligent-auditor context—that is, when the corporate
plaintiff is at least equally culpable relative to the subject of its
lawsuit. 164 Because Pennsylvania law already applied
contributory negligence in the accounting context, the court found
that allowing the in pari delicto defense “dovetail[ed] with other
defenses which may be available to a negligent auditor.” 165 The
court noted that the adverse interest exception is applicable to
determine if the agent’s acts will be imputed to the corporation
and that the determination will turn on the “traditional, liberal
test for corporate benefit.” 166
A benefit to the corporation should be evaluated “in light of
the reasonable perspective of a third party in its dealing with the
agent.” 167 The question to ask is: “[W]hether there is sufficient
lack of benefit (or apparent adversity) such that it is fair to
charge the third party with notice that the agent is not acting
with the principal’s authority.” 168 The court found this approach
162. See id. at 336 (“[Imputation] principles do not (and should not) apply in
circumstances in which the agent’s authority is neither actual nor apparent, as
where both the agent and the third party know very well that the agent’s
conduct goes unsanctioned by one or more of the tiers of corporate governance.”).
163. See id. at 335 (drawing a “sharp distinction between those who deal in
good faith with the principal-corporation in material matters and those who do
not”).
164. Id. at 330.
165. Id. at 335; see also id. at 335 n.31 (“[U]nder prevailing Pennsylvania
law as presently established by the Superior Court, contributory negligence in
the accounting context . . . continues to function as a complete bar to recovery
under negligence theory.”).
166. Id. at 336.
167. Id. at 338.
168. Id. On this point, see also McRaith v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 909 N.E.2d
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to be consistent with the core concept of apparent authority in the
first instance. 169
Because the court combined the benefit analysis with the
risk-allocation purpose of imputation, it applied a different
benefit test in the collusive-auditor context. 170 In a setting
involving auditors who have not proceeded in material good faith,
the court held that a “knowing, secretive, fraudulent
misstatement of corporate financial information” will never be a
benefit to a corporation. 171 But this type of misstatement could
provide a benefit to the corporation in the negligent-auditor
context which would foreclose the adverse interest exception,
permit imputation, and allow the in pari delicto defense. 172
b. Those Who Do Not Proceed in Good Faith
When outsiders are “in” on the fraud, the court found that
the “ordinary rationale for imputation breaks down
completely.” 173 The agent’s authority in this case is neither actual
nor apparent. 174 Both the agent and the third party “know very
well that the agent’s conduct goes unsanctioned by one or more of
the tiers of corporate governance.” 175 To impute the agent’s
knowledge to the corporation in this case would be to charge the
310, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (explaining that the adverse interest exception
“suspends the operation of the general rule when the circumstances are such as
to raise a clear presumption that the agent will not perform [his] duty, and thus
that the principal will not in fact receive and have the benefit of the agent’s
knowledge”).
169. See AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 338 (Pa. 2010) (“Notably, such approach
dovetails with the core concept of apparent authority in the first instance.”).
170. See id. at 336, 338 (providing different tests for corporate benefit in the
negligent-auditor and collusive-auditor contexts).
171. Id. at 338.
172. See id. at 335 (“On balance, we believe the best course is for
Pennsylvania common law to continue to recognize the availability of the in pari
delicto defense (upon appropriate and sufficient pleadings and proffers), via the
necessary imputation, in the negligent-auditor context.”).
173. Id. at 336.
174. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the rule that an agent has no
authority to bind her principal when the third party with whom she deals knows
her acts go unsanctioned).
175. AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 336 (Pa. 2010).
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corporation with knowledge “as against a third party whose
agents actively and intentionally prevented those in [the]
governing structure who were non-participants in the fraud from
acquiring such knowledge.” 176 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found that “[s]uch an application of the imputation doctrine
seems ill-advised, if not perverse.” 177
In relation to the public policy reasons for the in pari delicto
defense, the court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion
in Cenco. 178 The court found that the importance of a policy that
incentivizes internal corporate monitoring is trumped by
“objectives of the traditional schemes of governing liability in
contract and in tort, including fair compensation and deterrence
of wrongdoing.” 179
4. New York
a. Majority Opinion
The New York Court of Appeals considered two separate
disputes in its Kirschner v. KPMG LLP 180 decision: (1) a litigation
trust bringing suit against many defendants on behalf of the nowbankrupt corporation’s unsecured creditors alleging that the
defendants either aided and abetted the corporate insiders in
carrying out the fraud, or were negligent in not discovering it, 181
and (2) a derivative action against an auditor alleging that the
auditor’s performance was not in accordance with professional
standards. 182 The court began by affirming its commitment to the
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 332 (“Pennsylvania law does not accord with Cenco in terms
of the degree to which the decision, in an auditor-liability context, prioritizes the
policy of incentivizing the internal corporate monitoring over the objectives of
the traditional schemes governing liability in contract and in tort . . . .”).
179. Id.
180. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 959 (N.Y. 2010) (holding
that the doctrine of in pari delicto will bar a derivative claim under New York
law where a corporation sues its outside auditor for professional malpractice or
negligence in failing to detect fraud committed by the corporation).
181. See id. at 946 (considering questions certified from the Second Circuit).
182. See id. at 949 (considering a question certified by the Delaware
Supreme Court).
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in pari delicto doctrine, which is grounded in “fundamental
concept[s] of morality and fair dealings.” 183
The court used agency principles to find that the corporate
officers’ acts were imputed to the principal in these cases because
they were acting within the scope of their corporate authority. 184
It recognized that the adverse interest exception to imputation
would be available if the agent had “totally abandoned his
principal’s interests and [was] acting entirely for his own or
another’s purpose.” 185 But where, as here, both the agent and the
principal realized a benefit, the agent’s act was imputed to the
principal. 186 The time at which to consider whether or not the
agent’s act is adverse to the principal is the time at which the act
was committed. 187 Therefore, a corporation’s ultimate demise is
not evidence of an adverse act by the agent. 188 If the agent’s act
was designed to enhance the corporation’s financial performance
at the time, the agent was not acting adversely to the interests of
the principal. 189
The court noted the strong policy reasons for leaving the
imputation principles untouched by exception, most importantly
that “imputation fosters an incentive for a principal to select
honest agents and delegate duties with care.” 190 The court
pointed out that the adverse interest exception has a narrow
183. Id. at 950.
184. See id. at 951 (noting that everyday activities central to a company’s
operations and well-being such as “issuing financial statements, accessing
capital markets, handling customer accounts, moving assets between corporate
entities, and entering into contracts” fall within the scope of corporate officers’
authority).
185. See id. at 952 (citing Center v. Hampton Affiliates, 488 N.E.2d 828,
829–30 (N.Y. 1985) and adding emphasis).
186. See id. (noting that New York’s formulation of the adverse interest
exception avoids ambiguity where there is a benefit to both the insider and the
corporation).
187. See id. at 953 (noting that “the mere fact that a corporation is forced to
file for bankruptcy does not determine whether its agents’ conduct was, at the
time it was committed, adverse to the company”).
188. Id.
189. See id. (“So long as the corporate wrongdoer’s fraudulent conduct
enables the business to survive—to attract investors and customers and raise
funds for corporate purposes—th[e] test [for the adverse interest exception] is
not met.”).
190. Id. at 951–52.
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scope. 191 If the disclosure of corporate fraud were to trigger the
application of the exception then “a corporation would be able to
invoke the adverse interest exception and disclaim virtually every
corporate fraud—even a fraud undertaken for the corporation’s
benefit—as soon as it was discovered and no longer helping the
company.” 192
The court noted that no one contests that traditional
imputation principles are essential in other contexts. 193 The
plaintiffs here, it noted, were only suggesting the rules be revised
in the in pari delicto context. 194 The court rejected this
suggestion; it found its current rules in this context to be
workable and anchored in sound public policy. 195 Why, for
instance, should the innocent shareholders of the auditing or
accounting firms be “held responsible for the sins of their errant
agents while the innocent stakeholders of the corporation itself
are not charged with knowledge of their wrongdoing agents”? 196
The court concluded that the doctrine of in pari delicto will bar a
derivative claim where a corporation attempts to sue its outside
auditor for failure to detect fraud committed by the
corporation. 197
b. Dissenting Opinion
Three judges of seven disagreed that the in pari delicto
doctrine supports such a hard-line stance. 198 The doctrine, they
argued, is premised on “concepts of morality, fair dealings, and
191. See id. at 952 (“The rationale for the adverse interest exception
illustrates its narrow scope.”).
192. Id. at 953.
193. See id. at 954 (“No one disputes that traditional imputation principles,
including a narrowly confined adverse interest exception, should remain
unchanged—indeed, are essential—in other contexts.”).
194. See id. (“Although they do not stress the point, [plaintiffs’] proposals to
revise imputation rules are limited to in pari delicto cases.”).
195. See id. at 959 (“The principles of in pari delicto and
imputation, . . . which are embedded in New York law, remain sound.”).
196. Id. at 958.
197. Id. at 959.
198. See id. at 960 (“The principles underlying [agency law and the in pari
delicto] doctrine do not support such a hard-line stance.”).
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justice,” which should be shaped to the particulars of an
individual case. 199 The adverse interest exception was created
because, when an “agent is engaged in a scheme to defraud his
principal,” the presumption of agency law—that the knowledge
held by the agent was disclosed to the principal—fails. 200 The
dissent agreed that the exception requires a showing of harm to
the principal, but it found that harm in insider fraud. 201 It
reasoned that giving the corporation longer life through fraud is
“not a true benefit.” 202
The dissent expressed concern that the public interest is not
served by immunizing gatekeeper professionals. 203 It approved of
the exceptions to imputation and in pari delicto recognized by
New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 204 Specifically, the dissent would
“recognize a carve-out or exception to the in pari delicto doctrine
for cases involving corporate insider fraud enabled by complicit or
negligent outside gatekeeper professionals.” 205
5. Delaware
The Delaware Court of Chancery has not directly addressed,
under Delaware law, whether an auditor may raise the in pari
delicto defense against a plaintiff suing on behalf of a corporation
imputed with its agents’ fraud. But it has considered imputation
and the in pari delicto defense separately under Delaware law
and together applying New York law. 206
199. Id. at 961.
200. Id. (citing Center v. Hampton Affiliates, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 828, 829 (N.Y.
1985)).
201. See id. at 962 (“It is axiomatic that the adverse interest exception
requires a showing of harm to the principal . . . .”).
202. See id. (“[I]nsider fraud that merely gives the corporation life longer
than it would naturally have is not a true benefit to the corporation but can be
considered a harm.”).
203. See id. (“Important policy concerns militate against the strict
application of these agency principles.”).
204. See id. at 963 (“For these and other reasons, our sister courts in New
Jersey and Pennsylvania have carved out exceptions or limitations to the
imputation and in pari delicto rules.”).
205. Id. at 964.
206. See generally AIG II, 976 A.2d 872 (Del. Ch. 2009) (addressing in pari
delicto raised by co-conspirators who were not auditors and the adverse interest

CORPORATE WRONGDOING

311

First, in In re American International Group, Inc.,
Consolidated Derivative Litigation (AIG I), 207 derivative plaintiffs
brought suit against AIG’s auditor PricewaterhouseCooper for
malpractice and breach of contract. 208 Then-Vice Chancellor, now
Chancellor Strine, writing for the Court of Chancery, held that
New York law applied and required dismissal because “New York
law immunizes an auditor’s breach of its professional duty of care
where it fails to discover a fraud committed by a corporation’s top
insiders.” 209 In so holding, Strine was clear that Delaware law
would not necessarily reach a similar outcome. 210
Second, in the identically titled In re American International
Group, Inc., Consolidated Derivative Litigation (AIG II), 211 the
court considered the derivative plaintiffs’ claim against nonauditor co-conspirators. 212 Here, Delaware law applied and the
Court of Chancery, again through Chancellor Strine, dismissed
the claim because in pari delicto barred the plaintiffs—acting on
behalf of the corporation—from recovering from third-party coconspirators. In these recent cases, Delaware’s Court of Chancery
presents its position in support of a strong in pari delicto defense,
but not to immunize auditors. 213 These cases offer helpful critique
of New York’s extreme position—to immunize auditors in all
cases—and offer suggestions on how the law could do better.

exception under Delaware law); AIG I, 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009) (addressing
imputation, the adverse interest exception, and in pari delicto applying New
York law).
207. See AIG I, 965 A.2d at 831 (holding that under New York law in pari
delicto barred the shareholder derivative claims against AIG’s auditor).
208. See
id.
at
776
(presenting
plaintiff’s
claim
against
PricewaterhouseCooper).
209. Id. at 779.
210. See id. at 828 & n.246 (presenting seven reasons why Chancellor Strine
would be “chary about following the New York approach”).
211. See AIG II, 976 A.2d at 877 (holding that a corporation may not recover
against its third-party co-conspirators).
212. See id. at 875–77 (presenting the derivative plaintiffs’ claims against an
insurance broker, an insurer, a reinsurance corporation, and their subsidiaries).
213. See id. at 895 & n.60 (finding that in pari delicto should bar a
corporation’s suit against its co-conspirators but that the corporation “is free to
go after its own directors, officers, and employees,” and including outside
auditors in the group of “corporate insiders” from whom the corporation can
recover).
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a. The Adverse Interest Exception and In Pari Delicto

The Court of Chancery’s application of the adverse interest
exception highlights the exception’s inadequacy in the corporate
fraud context. In AIG I, Chancellor Strine held that, under New
York law, the adverse interest exception could not apply because
the directors and officers acted, in part, to benefit the
corporation. 214 In so finding, the Chancellor was critical of New
York’s approach to the exception:
In reaching this conclusion, I note that in applying the in pari
delicto doctrine, New York law does not embrace the notion
that any conscious act of a fiduciary causing a corporation to
break the law is against the corporation’s charter and best
interests. In the in pari delicto context, what the adverse
interest test is directed to is whether the insider is essentially
stealing from the corporation as opposed to engaging in
improper acts that, even if also self-interested, have the effect
of benefiting the corporation financially, even if that benefit
rested on illegal accounting or other illicit conduct. 215

This passage conveys the court’s disagreement with a test for the
adverse interest exception—in the specific case of applying the
exception to prevent the in pari delicto defense—that focuses on
corporate benefit. The court seems to suggest that when an agent
“engag[ed] in improper acts,” which are contrary to the
corporation’s charter and best interest, 216 the corporation should
not be barred from recovery by the in pari delicto defense. 217 This
point illustrates that imputation and the adverse interest
exception are inadequate tools for measuring corporate fault as
an element of the in pari delicto defense. They do not take into
account that the agent’s fraud—which should not be deemed
“adverse” because it is the very act that imputation is designed to
214. AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 827 (Del. Ch. 2009).
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01 (2007) (“Every corporation
incorporated under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful
business . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011) (“A corporation may be
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful
business or purposes . . . .”).
217. See AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 891 (Del. Ch. 2009) (providing an example to
illustrate that in pari delicto should give way to allow recovery when a
corporation is suing a third party who helped an agent harm the corporation).
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protect third parties against—is contrary to the corporation’s
interest, lawful purpose, and long-term health. 218 This
inadequacy is further highlighted by the court’s application of the
exception in AIG II.
Despite the court’s criticism of New York’s approach in AIG I,
in AIG II—applying Delaware law—the court followed New
York’s approach to find that the in pari delicto defense applied. In
this case, the court did not clearly articulate the rule for the
adverse interest exception under Delaware law. 219 Indeed, the
court cited to Cenco, a decision that it criticized in AIG I as “freewheeling.” 220 The AIG II court required, and did not find, “total
abandonment of the corporation’s interests” for the adverse
interest exception to apply. 221
This approach is not consistent with prior Delaware law on
the adverse interest exception. 222 Chancellor Strine recently
218. Cf. Strine et al., supra note 66, at 650 (“When directors knowingly
cause the corporation to . . . engage in unlawful acts . . . they are disloyal to the
corporation’s essential nature. By causing the corporation to become a lawless
rogue, they make the corporation untrue to itself and to the promise underlying
its own societally authorized birth.”).
219. See AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 891 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“Many courts have
recognized the so-called ‘adverse-interest exception,’ which permits a
corporation to sue its co-conspirators when the corporate agent responsible for
the wrongdoing was acting solely to advance his own personal financial interest,
rather than that of the corporation itself.” (emphasis added) (citing authority
from the Second Circuit which applied New York law)).
220. AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 826 (Del. Ch. 2009).
221. AIG II, 976 A.2d at 891. The court hinted that a corporation “should be
able to sue the third party that helped the fiduciary harm the corporation,” but
apparently did not find sufficient “harm” to the corporation for that to be
relevant here. Id. Using a circular justification, the court indicated that to
prevent a complicit third party from raising the in pari delicto defense, the
conspirators would have to be “harming” the corporation such that the adverse
interest exception would apply, which itself would preclude use of in pari
delicto. See id. (finding that the corporation here could not sue the third party
which helped its fiduciaries harm it because the fiduciaries were not alleged to
have totally abandoned the corporation’s interests as would be necessary to
invoke the adverse interest exception). This may be explained by the court’s
position in a footnote that the adverse interest exception can be seen as an
exception either to in pari delicto or to imputation with the same effect. Id. at
891 n.50.
222. See In re HealthSouth Corp. S’holders Litig., 845 A.2d 1096, 1108 n.22
(Del. Ch. 2003) (“When corporate fiduciaries—such as [the corporation’s]
managers—have a self-interest in concealing information—such as the falsity of
the financial statements that they had helped prepare—their knowledge cannot
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stated: “When corporate fiduciaries—such as [the corporation’s]
managers—have a self-interest in concealing information—such
as the falsity of the financial statements that they had helped
prepare—their knowledge cannot be imputed to the
corporation.” 223 If Delaware applied this rule in all corporate
fraud cases, the corporate insiders’ fraud would rarely if ever
impute to the corporation.
But Delaware did not adhere to this rule in AIG II for three
possible reasons. First, the identity of the defendant altered the
court’s willingness to foreclose plaintiff’s recovery. In AIG I, when
plaintiffs brought suit against AIG’s auditor, the court was highly
critical of New York’s rule which “immunizes auditors.” 224 And on
the facts of a 2003 case 225 when recovery by the plaintiff would
have been absurd, the court articulated a low standard for the
adverse interest exception to avoid imputation. 226 But in AIG II,
plaintiffs sought to recover from non-auditor co-conspirators.
Here, the court favored application of New York’s hard-to-attain
adverse interest exception and rigid in pari delicto doctrine
because it sought to avoid helping the corporation shift costs to
its “partners in crime.” 227
A second reason the court may have applied the adverse
interest exception differently is that the court is limited by the
be imputed to the corporation.”); Holley v. Jackson, 158 A.2d 803, 808 (Del. Ch.
1959) (“Ordinarily the knowledge of an agent is imputed to his principal . . .
[but] where an agent is interested in the result of a transaction adversely to the
interest of his principal, the rule of imputed knowledge on the part of the
principal no longer obtains.” (citation omitted)).
223. In re HealthSouth Corp., 845 A.2d at 1108 n.22.
224. See, e.g., AIG I, 965 A.2d at 779 (holding that the claim must be
dismissed despite pleading which suggest that the auditor did not live up to its
responsibilities).
225. See In re HealthSouth Corp., 845 A.2d at 1107 (holding that defendant’s
argument “lack[ed] logical force” when he attempted to invoke the in pari delicto
defense by imputing his wrongdoing as CEO, and the wrongdoing of his
subordinates, to the corporation attempting to recover from him).
226. See id. (finding that imputing to the corporation the conduct of
managers to allow the CEO defendant, to whom the managers reported, to raise
in pari delicto would be “silly”).
227. See AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 894 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that as between
derivative plaintiffs and non-auditor co-conspirators, “[a]dhering to a more
traditional approach to in pari delicto yields a more productive and efficient
result”).
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advocacy of the parties before it. 228 The AIG II court was
unimpressed with the plaintiffs’ arguments against in pari delicto
which included advancing new exceptions to the doctrine. 229
Lastly, the adverse interest exception and in pari delicto are
alterable doctrines which have been subject to results-driven
application. 230 Courts apply the adverse interest exception
inconsistently because it does not address the core issue—the
corporation’s blameworthiness and the suitability of foreclosing
its ability to sue a third party. 231
b. Auditors as Defendants
In dicta, the Court of Chancery in AIG I and AIG II
presented a clear position on auditor liability in the corporate
fraud context. 232 It found that auditors are more like corporateinsider agents than outside third parties. 233 And because
“imputation does not furnish a basis on which an agent may
defend against a claim by the principal,” an auditor likewise

228. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 333 (Pa. 2010) (“Common-law decisionmaking is subject to inherent limitations, as it is grounded in records of
individual cases and the advocacy by the parties shaped by those records.”); AIG
II, 976 A.2d at 884 (admonishing plaintiffs for advancing “several hard to
distinguish arguments”).
229. See AIG II, 976 A.2d at 884 (“[P]laintiffs seek to exploit the squishy
manner in which some courts have employed the in pari delicto doctrine and to
avoid dismissal by having this court find that this case falls within some
‘exception’ to the traditional application of the doctrine.”).
230. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing courts’ use of the adverse interest
exception including carve-outs to the rule created to achieve a just result); see
also AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 826–27 (Del. Ch. 2009) (noting that “some courts
applying New York law have arguably strained logic and linguistics to avoid
applying the adverse interest exception faithfully”).
231. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that in pari delicto should only be
available in those cases where the corporation bears actual fault).
232. See AIG II, 976 A.2d at 895 n.60 (“Suits against corporate agents like
outside auditors are best conceived of as also within the confines of a single
corporate conspirator and are consistent with the traditional acceptance of
derivative suits against corporate insiders.”).
233. See AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246 (“Immunizing the auditor does not aid
genuine third-parties, as such immunity is not necessary for the corporation to
be held responsible to third-parties for the insiders’ official wrongdoing.”
(emphasis added)).
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should not be permitted to invoke imputation. 234 Without
imputation, the court found that an auditor has no basis for an in
pari delicto defense because “the corporation did not know of the
illegal conduct and was not at equal fault.” 235
Delaware takes the position that “regardless of whether the
adverse interest exception is seen as an exception to in pari
delicto or to imputation, the effect is the same.” 236 It is useful,
however, to keep the agency law principle of imputation distinct
from the in pari delicto doctrine. The adverse interest exception
applies only to imputation. And accordingly, asking if a
corporation knew of the illegal conduct through imputation is
distinct from asking if the corporation was at equal fault under in
pari delicto. 237 Courts’ use of imputation to find “fault” as an
element of the in pari delicto defense is misplaced. Separating the
two doctrines is essential to bringing the right issue—the
corporation’s wrongdoing—into focus. The questions then become
whose acts can best capture the acts of “the corporation,” and
what constitutes wrongdoing? 238
III. Current Law Does Not Adequately Address the Issue
A. Where the Law Stands at Present: Imputation Sometimes
While many courts have considered auditor liability in the
corporate fraud context, their approaches to the issue are varied.
Some courts have followed the pioneering case of Cenco to rely on

234. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b (2006); see also AIG II,
976 A.2d 872, 890 n.49 (Del. Ch. 2009) (using the term “corporate agents” to
encompass both auditors and corporate insiders and noting that “the policy
basis for allowing . . . derivative suits can easily be seen as justifying claims
against corporate agents like outside auditors”).
235. AIG II, 976 A.2d at 891 n.50.
236. Id.
237. See infra Part IV (arguing that a corporation’s fault should be
measured based on the actions of the board, not based on imputation principles
intended for a different purpose—that of protecting third parties with a claim
against the corporation).
238. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that a corporation should be judged by the
adequacy of the information gathering and reporting systems implemented by
the board of directors and carried out by corporate employees).
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tort-liability objectives. 239 These courts will impute the corporate
officers’ fraud to the corporation if the fraud led to any short-term
benefit and will rely on this imputation to prevent a party acting
on behalf of the corporation from pursuing a claim against the
corporation’s auditor. 240 Others have attacked the problem
focusing primarily on agency law principles. 241 This mode of
analysis will preclude a collusive auditor but not a negligent
auditor from raising the in pari delicto defense. Because a third
party who does not deal with a principal in good faith has no
basis in agency law to invoke imputation, the argument goes, it
has no basis for the in pari delicto defense. 242 Still others have
used some combination of both or have simply held that, as a
policy matter, auditors may not invoke imputation. 243 Because
imputation and the adverse interest exception do not squarely
address the problem, these courts have used policy and fairness
arguments to conclude that auditors should not be immune from
liability. 244 One commonality among all approaches is a focus on

239. See, e.g., In re Jack Greenberg, 212 B.R. 76, 90 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“[I]t
appears that what the Cenco line of cases adds to the jurisprudence is an
express recognition, implicit in the earlier imputation cases, that the objectives
of tort liability are to be the touchstone by which a court should consider the
invocation of the doctrine.”).
240. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 952 (N.Y. 2010)
(relying on Cenco to find that the adverse interest exception should not apply,
and in pari delicto should bar the claim, when the officers’ conduct defrauds
others for the corporation’s benefit rather than defrauding the corporation
itself).
241. See generally AHERF, 989 A.2d 313 (Pa. 2010) (noting that agency law
plays a pivotal role in the availability of the in pari delicto defense and
concluding that auditors accused of fraud may not raise the defense because
agency law does not allow a complicit third party to invoke imputation).
242. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b (2006) (“[I]mputation
protects innocent third parties but not those who know or have reason to know
that an agent is not likely to transmit material information to the principal.”).
243. See, e.g., NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 888 (N.J. 2006)
(“[Tort] principles, applied in light of the nature of today’s corporations, require
that [shareholder] suits be permitted and that negligent auditors be held
responsible for their wrongdoing.”).
244. See id. at 885, 888 (discussing the unfairness of “punish[ing] the many
for the faults of the few,” and explaining that tort principles applied in light of
the nature of today’s corporation require that auditor malpractice suits be
permitted).
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imputation and the adverse interest exception rather than on the
in pari delicto defense. 245
The use of the in pari delicto defense—an absolute defense
that precludes the plaintiff from reaching the merits of its case
and insulates auditors as a group from liability—deserves more
thoughtful consideration. Notwithstanding Judge Posner’s
famous declaration that “fraud on behalf of a corporation is not
the same thing as fraud against it,” 246—which led courts and
advocates to focus on imputation and the adverse interest
exception—one agent’s fraud should not be the touchstone of an
analysis into whether the corporation is a wrongdoer in the
pertinent sense. Imputation and the adverse interest exception
will be relevant to some claims and defenses in corporate fraud
cases, but they should not be determinative of allowing or
disallowing the in pari delicto defense. 247 Imputation does not
carry the burden of showing that a corporate plaintiff is at fault
for the underlying illegality, which is a necessary element of the
in pari delicto defense. 248
B. The Direction the Law Should Travel: Imputation
Should Apply
1. The Adverse Interest Exception Should Not Apply
A corporation should be imputed with the knowledge of its
agents. 249 The adverse interest exception to imputation addresses
a specific, limited set of circumstances. 250 It will not and should
245. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d at 328 (“The Latin derivation and equitable
origins of the underlying common-law maxim [of in pari delicto] have been well
traveled and need not be revisited at length here.”).
246. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982).
247. See supra note 72 (discussing imputation’s role in other defenses).
248. See AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that New
York’s approach to imputation and in pari delicto “addresses the issue by rote,
applying agency principles developed for other purposes”).
249. See supra Part II.A (discussing imputation).
250. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 11, at 309 (noting that the adverse
interest exception addresses the narrow range of cases where the conduct by an
agent “is so wholly antagonistic to the principal’s interests that the relationship
between principal and agent could be viewed as severed”).
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not apply to the vast majority of cases dealing with auditor
liability in the corporate fraud context. 251 Trying to shove the
square peg of auditor liability into the round hole of the adverse
interest exception has led to confused rules governing
imputation. 252
The law should probe why an auditor should or should not be
permitted to invoke the absolute defense of in pari delicto when it
is charged with failure to comply with professional standards in
effectuating its engagement when that compliance is most
critical. 253 Asking whether the corporation retained a short-term
benefit from its agent’s fraud to trigger the adverse interest
exception and defeat imputation simply does not get us there.
2. Imputation Should Not Turn on Whether Auditors Were
Negligent or Collusive
Just as inquiries into corporate benefit or an agent’s intent
do not target the crux of the issue, neither does an approach that
bifurcates the issue based on whether the auditor was negligent
or complicit in the fraud. 254 As determined in Part II, agency
principles should defeat imputation against a collusive auditor
but not against a negligent auditor. 255 From a policy standpoint,
251. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 954 (N.Y. 2010) (noting
that “[n]o one disputes that traditional imputation principles, including a
narrowly confined adverse interest exception, should remain unchanged—
indeed, are essential—in other contexts”); see also id. (noting that plaintiffs’
proposed formulation of the adverse interest exception would push it “up to if
not beyond the point of extinction”).
252. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.A.1.a (presenting the court-fashioned
exceptions to the adverse interest exception).
253. See AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246 (praising the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s approach which treats “in pari delicto differently as to auditors precisely
because auditors are employed in part as a safeguard against managerial
financial fraud”).
254. See AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 335–36 (Pa. 2010) (holding that, in light of
the competing concerns at stake, the best course for Pennsylvania is to recognize
the availability of the in pari delicto defense, via the necessary imputation, in
the negligent-auditor context but not in the collusive-auditor context).
255. See supra Part II.A.2 (determining that in pari delicto should not be
available to a third party who secretly colluded with the principal’s agent to
commit fraud—even if the fraud isn’t “adverse” as the term is defined by state
law); see also AHERF, 989 A.2d at 336 (“[T]he ordinary rationale supporting
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though, there is no basis for the distinction. 256 Fraud is a more
egregious act, but an unsound audit flawed by negligence is
equally harmful to the public. And a rule that encourages auditors
“not to investigate too closely” does not address the need for sound
audits that help to deter corporate fraud.257
C. What Is at Stake in Allowing Claims to Proceed
Against Auditors
The importance of how courts apply the in pari delicto defense
in corporate fraud cases is underscored by the general debate over
whether it is desirable to allow suit against auditors. 258 An
auditor’s role in corporate monitoring is becoming increasingly
important; it has been the subject of recent legislation such as the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 259 and the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act. 260
The divergent opinions regarding the wisdom of allowing or
prohibiting suit against auditors are surveyed briefly below.

imputation breaks down completely in scenarios involving secretive, collusive
conduct between corporate agents and third parties.”).
256. See, e.g., supra Part III.C.2.a1 (discussing the important role auditors
play in informing investors).
257. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge
of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 345 (2004) (“[P]ublic policy
must seek to minimize the perverse incentives that induce the gatekeeper not to
investigate too closely.”).
258. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (discussing secondary liability and
holding that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because the text does not
prohibit aiding and abetting); see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 153 (2008) (holding that investors do not
have a private right of action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 against customer and supplier companies who participated in the
investors’ company’s fraud because the investors did not rely upon their
statements or representations).
259. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006).
260. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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1. Why the Law Should Insulate Auditors
a. Current Law Should Not Be “Weakened by Exception”
Application of simple agency principles to the chain of events in
corporate fraud cases—the existence of an agency relationship, an
agent’s fraud imputed to the principal corporation, the corporation
then being blocked from bringing a grievance to court—ends the
legal issue under one point of view. 261 The New York Court of
Appeals finds that existing law addresses the issue squarely and
finds no reason that existing law should be “weakened by
exception.” 262 Especially when “there are strong considerations of
public policy underlying this precedent: imputation fosters an
incentive for a principal to select honest agents and delegate duties
with care.” 263
b. The Public Is Best Served by Protecting Auditors
Proponents of auditor protection also argue that allowing
fraudulent corporations to shift responsibility to an outside auditor
will lead to a misallocation of responsibilities. 264 A corporation will
261. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 959 (N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he
principles of in pari delicto and imputation, with its narrow adverse interest
exception, which are embedded in New York law, remain sound.”).
262. Id. at 950 (citing McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 166
N.E.2d 494 (N.Y. 1960)).
263. Id. at 951–52; see also id. at 953 (noting that the presumption of
imputation reflects the recognition that principals are best suited to police their
agents); NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 904 (N.J. 2006) (RiveraSoto, J., dissenting) (noting that allowing a company to shift the consequences of
its own fraud may diminish management’s incentive to exercise due care in its
own responsibilities); AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 322 (Pa. 2010) (presenting
defendants’ argument that allowing a corporation to sue its auditor would
unwisely reduce incentives for corporations in selecting and monitoring their
agents). But see AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“I do not
understand how immunizing the auditors employed to help the independent
directors monitor will make either stockholders or independent directors better
monitors. I really do not get that.”).
264. See, e.g., Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 957 (framing the issue before the
court as whether a corporation should be permitted to shift responsibility for
their own agents’ misconduct to third parties); see also NCP Litig. Trust, 901
A.2d at 904 (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) (noting the argument presented by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants); AHERF, 989 A.2d at 334
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inevitably be the primary wrongdoer; 265 the auditor’s role is limited
and secondary. 266 Further, to punish the auditor’s innocent
shareholders rather than the fraudulent corporation’s innocent
shareholders creates a double standard. 267
Forcing auditors to defend their actions in court could lead to
“legal extortion.” 268 And the fear of liability will change the way
audits are performed. Audits will become more expensive 269 and
inaccessible to riskier clients such as small businesses with less
sophisticated internal controls. 270

(citing AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 889 (Del. Ch. 2009)).
265. See Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 958 (noting that “the corporation’s agents
would almost invariably play the dominant role”); see also Cenco Inc. v. Seidman
& Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982) (“If [the auditor] failed to police its
people, [the corporation] failed as or more dramatically to police its own.”).
266. See NCP Litig. Trust, 901 A.2d at 904 (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting)
(noting that the “auditor’s role in the accurate presentation of a client’s financial
statement is limited, and most importantly, secondary to that of the client”). But
see AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246 (“I question the soundness of premising a legal
rule on the belief that, in a simplistic binary choice, independent directors are
better equipped to detect high-level fraud than a company’s auditor.”).
267. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 958 (N.Y. 2010) (stating
that allowing corporations to shift responsibility for their own agents’
misconduct would create a double standard by which the innocent shareholders
of the outside professional are held responsible for the sins of their errant
agents but those of the corporation are not).
268. See NCP Litig. Trust, 901 A.2d at 903 n.14 (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting)
(finding that the majority’s rule “merely sanctions what is referred to as nothing
more than legal extortion: seeking a settlement simply because the costs of
defense are prohibitive”); cf. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163 (2008) (fearing in the securities fraud context that
expanding the cause of action available under § 10(b) would “allow plaintiffs
with weak claims to extort settlements from innocent companies”).
269. See AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 326 (Pa. 2010) (noting the argument of the
Accountant Institute that allowing the corporation to shift responsibility for its
wrongdoing would “result in prohibitively expensive audits”).
270. See id. at 327 (“[A]ccountants will be forced to be more selective about
the clients they serve, choosing only those with ‘blue ribbon’ risk management
and oversight systems, and rejecting those with less sophisticated internal
controls to minimize the accountant’s litigation risk.”).
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2. Why the Law Should Not Insulate Auditors
a. Auditors Should Be Held Accountable for Their Work
The arguments against isolating auditors from liability turn on
their role as a gatekeeper. Shareholders rely on third-party
professionals to monitor the officers and directors of the companies
in which they invest. 271 In reality, most shareholders have no
control over management and should not be saddled with the
unrealistic expectation of selecting honest agents. 272 And just as the
law must seek to deter wrongdoing within corporations, it must seek
to deter auditor wrongdoing. 273 To completely isolate such a group
from the possibility of liability for negligent or fraudulent work
would be inequitable. 274

271. See NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 886 (N.J. 2006)
(“[M]any investors play a passive role in the oversight of a firm’s day-to-day
operations, relying instead on third-party professionals to assist in monitoring
the corporation’s officers and directors.”); Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d
941, 962 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (“Investors rely heavily on
information prepared by or approved by auditors, accountants, and other
gatekeeper professionals.”).
272. See NCP Litig. Trust, 901 A.2d at 886 (“[T]he nature of today’s
corporation makes it increasingly unlikely that shareholders of large
corporations have the ability to effectively monitor the actions of corporate
officials.”).
273. See id. (“[O]ur focus cannot be limited only to deterring wrongdoing on
the part of corporate shareholders. We must seek to deter wrongdoing on the
part of corporate auditors.”); Coffee, supra note 257, at 345 (“[P]ublic policy
must seek to minimize the perverse incentives that induce the gatekeeper not to
investigate too closely.”).
274. See NCP Litig. Trust, 901 A.2d at 890 (“A limited imputation defense
will properly compensate the victims of corporate fraud without indemnifying
wrongdoers for their fraudulent activities.”); AHERF, 989 A.2d at 332 (“[W]e are
cognizant of the special—and crucial—role assumed by independent auditors as
a check against potential management abuses.”); Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 962
(Ciparick, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, these simplistic agency principles as applied
by the majority serve to effectively immunize auditors and other outside
professionals from liability wherever any corporate insider engages in fraud.”);
see also id. at 963 (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (“[S]trict imputation rules merely
invite gatekeeper professionals to neglect their duty to ferret out fraud by
corporate insiders because even if they are negligent, there will be no damages
assessed against them for their malfeasance.” (citations omitted)).
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b. Auditor Liability Need Not Be Uncapped

Opening auditors to the possibility of liability does not require
that they be exposed to “uncapped liability” for their negligent
failure to detect financial fraud by corporate managers.275 This
concern over keeping the auditor industry healthy can be addressed
in ways other than complete immunity, such as by capping liability
at some multiple of audit fees and allowing audit firms full
indemnification rights against any insider who acted with
scienter. 276
IV. Proposed Solution
This Note argues that auditors should not be immune from
liability for negligent work simply because they performed that
work for a corporation whose insider directors or officers
committed fraud. This is not because those fraudulent acts are
not imputed to the corporation. They are. It is because
imputation should not be determinative of whether a defendant
may successfully invoke the in pari delicto defense. Imputation
requires a court to ask if an agent’s acts were sufficient to ascribe
legal responsibility to the principal; in pari delicto requires a
court to ask if the plaintiff bears substantially equal fault for the
harm it suffered for which it seeks redress. 277 These are not the
same question.
Imputation plays a different role (1) when the corporation
defends against suit by a third party, and (2) when it attacks a
third party, as a plaintiff, for the third party’s wrongdoing that
harmed the corporation. 278 In the first case, imputation ends the
275. AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009).
276. See id. (noting that the New York approach does not address possible
solutions to the fear of uncapped liability in a direct or thoughtful way).
277. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299,
307 (1985) (defining the classic formulation of in pari delicto to include
situations “where the plaintiff truly bore at least substantially equal
responsibility for his injury”).
278. See AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246 (criticizing the New York rule which
combines imputation and in pari delicto to bar claims against an auditor
because the rule “conflates, in a simplistic way, related, but separate, questions
of agency”); see also id. (“It is a policy judgment, not some rote conflation of
contextually different questions of agency, that must determine whether, [like
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inquiry. It is for this case that agency principles were developed
and function properly. 279 It is also here that the “severe” results
of imputation are supportable: as between a third party and a
corporation, the corporation should be held responsible for its
agent’s acts regardless of fault. 280 But in the second case, a
determination of fault is required and demands a more
thoughtful analysis than simple agency principles are designed to
provide. 281 Imputation—or, more precisely, the fraud committed
by the corporation’s agents—will play a role in this analysis, but
not a determinative one.
A. In Pari Delicto Should Apply Only if the Corporation Is a
Wrongdoer
Auditors use the in pari delicto defense to block suit brought
on behalf of a corporation imputed with its agents’ fraud. In pari
delicto literally means “in equal fault,” and is intended to prevent
a “deliberate wrongdoer from recovering from a co-conspirator or
accomplice.” 282 An element of the defense, then, is that the
corporate plaintiff be a wrongdoer. 283
an inside director accused of negligence], an auditor should face liability for
professional negligence to its client corporation in similar circumstances.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) (“Knowledge, including
imputed knowledge, is not always determinative of, and sometimes is not even
relevant to, certain claims and defenses.”).
279. See DeMott, supra note 11, at 292–93 (“Treating nations and
corporations as legally consequential persons necessitates doctrines—like
imputation and other agency-law doctrines—that explain how such persons may
take action in the physical world with legal consequences.”).
280. See id. at 319 (noting that a principal should be liable to third parties
“even when the principal was without fault in selecting or monitoring the
agent”).
281. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) (stating
that a principal’s claim against an auditor “should not be defeated by imputing
to the principal its agents’ knowledge of deficiencies in the processes under
scrutiny”); see also AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that
New York’s approach to imputation and in pari delicto “addresses the issue by
rote, applying agency principles developed for other purposes”).
282. Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying in pari
delicto to bar plaintiff’s claim under Massachusetts law).
283. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299,
307 (1985) (defining the classic formulation of in pari delicto to include
situations “where the plaintiff truly bore at least substantially equal
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Only if the corporation is at fault in a meaningful sense of
the term should the corporation be deemed a wrongdoer, and only
then should the defense of in pari delicto apply. 284 Imputing the
act of an agent should not be enough. Fault is not necessary, nor
even relevant to, the process of imputation. 285 Agency doctrines
are “not fault-based; the legal consequences of an agent’s actions
are attributable to a principal even when the principal was
without fault in selecting or monitoring the agent.” 286
That the corporation may not be at fault even though an
agent committed fraudulent acts becomes especially apparent
when one considers that an auditor, who was retained for the very
purpose of monitoring corporate activity, failed to meet its
professional standards. 287 What is more, it is only in those cases
where the very thing auditors are retained to help guard
against—fraud—exists that the in pari delicto defense has
worked to immunize auditors from answering for their own
potential wrongdoing. 288 A corporation doing everything right
should not be barred from seeking redress for harm that it

responsibility for his injury”).
284. Cf. F.D.I.C. v. O’Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 751 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“We conclude that ADSB has a corporate identity distinct from that of its
wrongdoing officers.”).
285. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 11, at 319 (“Basic agency doctrines are not
fault-based . . . .”).
286. Id.
287. See AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[A]lthough
auditors give no warranty that they can detect fraud, the requirement for public
companies to employ auditors is in large measure inspired by the recognition
that corporate insiders have more than rarely been known to engage in financial
shenanigans.”); see also NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 886 (N.J.
2006) (“[T]hird-party auditors are specifically retained for the task of monitoring
corporate activity.”).
288. See AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246 (“[I]mmunizing auditors in situations
when, but for the auditor’s professional negligence, wrongful managerial
behavior may have been stopped before it resulted in grievous harm relieves the
audit firm of any responsibility in one of the circumstances when the auditor’s
compliance with its professional standard of care is most critical.”); AIG II, 976
A.2d 872, 890 n.49 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[T]here is a strong argument to be made
that [gatekeeper professionals like auditors] ought to be accountable for their
malpractice and not be immunized by the very actions that were not discovered
due to their failure to meet expected professional standards.”).
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suffered based solely on the existence of a fraudulent agent
somewhere in its ranks. 289
Not every corporation, perhaps not most, will fit this mold. In
Cenco, for example, the massive fraud involved the chairman and
president, a number of vice presidents, and other top
management; and the evidence suggested that those directors not
involved were “negligent in allowing [the fraud] to flourish
undetected beneath their noses.” 290 This was not a case of one or
several rogue agents committing fraud. Many parties with control
used the corporation to engage in massive fraud. Here, it would
be fair to consider the corporation a wrongdoer and bar it from
bringing a claim before the court. Relying on simple imputation
principles to reach this result, however, “conflates, in a simplistic
way, related, but separate, questions of agency.” 291 To determine
a corporation’s fault, then, the law can and should look
elsewhere.
B. Measuring Fault to Determine if the Corporation Is
a Wrongdoer
A corporation can only act through its agents. 292 Any attempt
to judge a corporation will be limited by this reality. But this
limitation should not be fatal to an attempt at better measuring a
corporation’s actions than through simple agency principles. 293
One possible solution is to assess a corporation’s fault based on
the information gathering and reporting systems that the board
of directors has in place to deter and detect fraud. Corporate law
289. See, e.g., In re NM Holdings Co., LLC, 411 B.R. 542, 550 (E.D. Mich.
2009) (“The rationale for applying the sole actor exception [and imputing the
agent’s fraud] is much weaker where the wrongdoer is not the sole shareholder
because the identity between the corporation and the wrongdoer is more
attenuated in such cases.”).
290. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1982).
291. AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246.
292. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010)
(“Corporations are not natural persons. Of necessity, they must act solely
through the instrumentality of their officers or other duly authorized agents.”
(citations omitted)).
293. See AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that auditor
liability should be addressed in a “direct or thoughtful way,” not “by rote,
applying agency principles developed for other purposes”).
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supports the proposition that the policies implemented by the
board of directors are a good measure of a corporation’s acts.
Upon incorporation, every corporation will create articles of
incorporation, adopt bylaws, and elect a board of directors. 294 The
board of directors will then appoint officers to function in the
capacity set forth in the bylaws, generally management of the
day-to-day operations. 295 The officers remain under the direction,
and subject to the oversight, of the board of directors. 296 In
addition to selecting corporate management, the board of
directors must implement information gathering and reporting
systems to keep informed. 297 These systems must monitor the
activities of both high-level managers and lower-level employees
to allow the board and senior management to “reach informed
judgments concerning . . . the corporation’s compliance with
law.” 298 Failure to assure that such systems exist would be a
breach of the board’s fiduciary duty to shareholders and could
render directors personally liable to shareholders for harm
caused by the failure. 299
Through this structure, all corporate activity and corporate
policy originates from the board of directors. The systems put in
place and implemented by the board of directors, then, may
provide the best yardstick by which to measure a corporation’s
acts. 300 If the corporation’s reporting systems are inadequate to
294. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 2.02, 2.05, 2.06 (2007).
295. See, e.g., id. § 8.41 (“Each officer has the authority and shall perform
the functions set forth in the bylaws, or to the extent consistent with the bylaws,
the functions prescribed by the board of directors . . . .”).
296. See id. § 8.01 (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and
affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and
subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . . .”).
297. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970
(Del. Ch. 1996) (“[A] director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith
to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board
concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so . . . may . . . render a
director liable for losses caused by non-compliance . . . .”).
298. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 368 (Del. 2006) (citing Caremark, 698
A.2d at 967).
299. See, e.g., Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (noting that a failure may render
directors liable for losses caused by noncompliance); see also MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 8.31 (presenting the standards of liability for directors).
300. Cf. Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 902 (8th Cir. 2004) (“When
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the goal of detecting and deterring insider fraud, the corporation
can fairly be deemed a “knowing and substantial participant” in
the fraud. 301 And it can fairly be precluded by the in pari delicto
defense from recovering from others who were part of the
illegality.
The question of by what standard the adequacy of corporate
systems should be measured remains. The line separating
adequate from inadequate systems would attempt to identify
when the corporation can be equated with being a knowing
participant in the fraud. 302 Once that line is crossed—and the
corporation is deemed to be a “knowing and substantial
participant” in the fraud—the corporation would be at equal fault
such that the in pari delicto defense would be successful against
it.
While this suggested approach to measuring corporate fault
draws from the systems that directors are required to implement,
the standard to find corporate fault would not necessarily track
the standard for director liability in this context. For director
liability, Delaware courts have set a high hurdle for plaintiffs
seeking to recover from individual directors. 303 Only upon an
“utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and
reporting system exists” will the necessary condition to liability
be established. 304 Essentially, any system will do to relieve
directors of liability. To relieve a corporation of a finding of fault
for failing to detect fraud, however, evidence of more than the
mere existence of systems may be desirable.

a corporation is involved, the inquiry [into intent] depends in part on corporate
policies . . . .”); Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 637 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (Ind.
1994) (finding no corporate intent because of “the sheer improbability that a
corporate employer would adopt policies through its regular decision-making
channels” sanctioning the behavior at issue).
301. AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 883–84 (Del. Ch. 2009).
302. See id. at 884 (noting that in pari delicto “requires the court to
determine that each party acted with scienter in the sense that it was a
knowing and substantial participant in the wrongful scheme”).
303. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch.
1996) (“Such a test of liability—lack of good faith as evidenced by sustained or
systematic failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight—is quite high.”).
304. Id.
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1. Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines as a Standard
for Adequate Systems
For this determination, it may be useful to refer, as
Chancellor Allen did in his Caremark opinion, to the Federal
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. 305 As part of an effort to
ensure corporate compliance with external legal requirements,
the Guidelines set forth a uniform sentencing structure for
organizations that violate criminal law. 306 Its goal is to “provide
just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for
organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing,
detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.” 307 In determining an
organization’s culpability, the Guidelines use as one mitigating
factor the existence of an effective compliance and ethics
program. 308 Because of this, Chancellor Allen concluded that
“[a]ny rational person” attempting to meet her responsibility as a
member of the board of directors must implement such a system
to take advantage of the reduced sanction in the event the
organization is convicted of a crime. 309
The Caremark opinion used the Guidelines only to conclude
that directors must implement such systems to avoid personal
liability. In the context of examining corporate acts to determine
if a corporation can meaningfully be considered a wrongdoer,
however, the Guidelines may provide additional assistance. The
mitigating factor of whether a corporation has an “effective
compliance and ethics program” targets acts by a corporation that
would render it less culpable for the underlying illegality. 310 The
idea of culpability under the Guidelines transfers effectively to
measure the corporation’s wrongdoing in failing to detect an
agent’s fraud. 311
305. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2011) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES].
306. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.
307. GUIDELINES, supra note 305, intro. commentary.
308. Id.
309. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
310. See GUIDELINES, supra note 305, § 8B2.1 (describing how an
organization can have an effective compliance and ethics program which would
reduce its culpability score).
311. The author thanks Washington and Lee University School of Law
Professor Christopher M. Bruner for suggesting the Guidelines as a helpful tool
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The standard laid out in the Guidelines for an effective
compliance and ethics program is straightforward. To have an
effective program, the organization must do two things: First, it
must exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal
conduct. 312 Second, it must promote “an organizational culture
that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance
with the law.” 313 The Guidelines offer details on how a
corporation can meet these two requirements. The corporation
should establish standards and procedures to detect and prevent
criminal conduct. The organization’s governing authority, highlevel personnel, and specific individuals within the organization
should all have a role to play in implementing these procedures.
An organization should take steps not to hire individuals known
to have engaged in illegal activities. It should have training
programs in place. The effectiveness of the program should be
periodically evaluated. The program should be promoted with
appropriate incentives for compliance and appropriate
disciplinary measures for noncompliance.
The Guidelines also offer factors to consider when evaluating
the adequacy of a corporation’s program. It enumerates relevant
factors: the applicable industry practice or government
standards, the size of the organization, and whether the
organization has engaged in similar misconduct in the past.
Notably, the Guidelines state that the failure to detect the
instant case of fraud does not necessarily mean that the program
is ineffective. 314
2. Applying the Guidelines as the Measure of Corporate
Wrongdoing
To measure corporate wrongdoing using this guide, a
threshold question would be, did the board implement adequate
systems? If the answer is yes, then the directors would not face
personal liability under Caremark. But the corporation may still
to evaluate a corporation’s acts in an effort to determine at what point a
corporation can be considered a wrongdoer.
312. GUIDELINES, supra note 305, § 8B2.1.
313. Id.
314. Id. § 8B2.1(a).
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be answerable for wrongdoing if officers and employees did not
use due diligence to implement the systems.
By judging a corporation based on its corporate systems,
corporate actors have an incentive to create and implement sound
systems—an incentive that parallels a director’s incentive to
implement these systems to avoid personal liability under
Caremark—that will protect the corporation’s ability to recover
from outsiders in the event that insiders are engaged in a
fraudulent scheme. Because no system will detect all fraud, a rule
that can strip a corporation of its cause of action based on the
fraudulent act of one agent disincentivizes the corporation from
pursuing rigorous anti-fraud policies. Measuring corporate
wrongdoing using corporate systems—for the purpose of
satisfying an element of the in pari delicto defense—would create
an incentive to create adequate systems and would result in a
corporation being judged by acts that can more fairly be
characterized as those of the corporation as a whole.
This suggestion speaks directly to the problem courts have
been circling by using exceptions to apply or not apply imputation
and in pari delicto. 315 For example, when there is no distinction
between the fault of the corporation and that of the agent—the
sole-actor exception—imputation is justified and should apply
regardless of an adverse interest. 316 But when the majority of the
board is honest and one among them is committing fraud—the
innocent
decision-maker
exception—imputation
seems
317
unwarranted and has been discarded.
315. See, e.g., In re CBI Holding Co., 311 B.R. 350, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(noting that the innocent insider exception seeks to prevent unfair punishment
of innocent members of management who would have prevented the misconduct
of the guilty had they known of it).
316. See, e.g., Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 527 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating
that under the sole actor exception an “agent’s fraudulent conduct will be
imputed to the principal regardless of whether the agent’s conduct was adverse
to the principal’s interests”); AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 331 (Pa. 2010) (noting that
when an “action [is] between a corporation controlled by a single individual and
a sole-proprietor auditor, there would be a good case to be made that in pari
delicto should apply to negate all causes of action” because any auditor
misrepresentation would have “full corporate complicity”).
317. See, e.g., Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, LLP, 212
B.R. 34, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that absent a finding that “all relevant
shareholders and/or decision-makers are involved in the fraud,” the fraud
cannot be imputed to the corporation for purposes of in pari delicto). But see
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Similarly, the idea of fault drives courts’ uncertainty over
allowing the defense when the appointment of a receiver or
bankruptcy trustee “removed the wrongdoer from the scene.” 318
Although this does not present an identical issue, it is another
instance where courts have struggled with applying in pari
delicto when the actual party before the court is not a wrongdoer.
This discomfort is warranted because the policy justifications for
in pari delicto—denying an admitted wrongdoer access to the
courts to deter illegality and prevent a waste of judicial
resources 319—are not advanced when the plaintiff has done no
wrong. Instead, the defendant unjustly uses an equitable doctrine
to skirt liability.
C. A Limited Application of In Pari Delicto Adheres to
Policy Objectives
Measuring fault based on corporate systems would require a
fact-intensive inquiry into the corporation’s policies to determine
if it could fairly be deemed a “knowing and substantial
participant in the wrongful scheme.” 320 This process may be more
demanding than simply imputing a fraudulent agent’s acts to the
corporation. On the other hand, with the current inquiries into
corporate benefit and the agent’s self-interest to determine if the
adverse interest exception applies, perhaps analyzing a
corporation’s fault would be less demanding. Notably, this inquiry
would not encompass the weighing of faults that in pari delicto is
calculated to avoid. 321 In fact, determining if a plaintiff has itself
Rudolph, supra note 36, at 580 (noting that “more courts have rejected, rather
than accepted, the ‘innocent decision-maker’ doctrine”).
318. Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995).
319. See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010)
(describing the policy justifications which have supported the doctrine for two
centuries).
320. AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 883–84 (Del. Ch. 2009) (noting that in pari delicto
“requires the court to determine that each party acted with scienter in the sense
that it was a knowing and substantial participant in the wrongful scheme”).
321. See id. at 894 (applying the in pari delicto defense to bar suit by the
plaintiff corporation against its non-auditor co-conspirators because “the in pari
delicto doctrine has long acted as a bar to the[] ponderous inquiries” of who was
more harmed by the parties’ illegal conduct); id. at 883–84 (“Although the literal
translation of in pari delicto is ‘in equal fault,’ the doctrine does not require that
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acted wrongly is necessary to the in pari delicto defense. Every
defendant who institutes the defense raises this issue for
determination. Just as human plaintiffs deserve an inquiry into
their behavior, corporate plaintiffs should be judged by theirs.
After such a determination, if the corporation is found
responsible for the fraud and the in pari delicto defense applies,
the auditor has a complete defense and will not have to answer
for any wrongdoing. This solution seems identical to the use of in
pari delicto and imputation to bar the claim and does not seem to
answer the important underlying question: should auditors as a
group be insulated from liability for professional malpractice?
This result is not identical, however, and answers the underlying
question in the negative while allowing for an exception only
when the doctrine of in pari delicto so requires.
Application of the in pari delicto defense only in those cases
where the plaintiff corporation is meaningfully at fault creates a
fair and workable result for three reasons. First, this is not a
blanket rule that immunizes auditors in all cases. The auditor
will skirt liability in some cases where its performance fell short
of the professional mark. But this is consistent with the policy
judgment that in pari delicto represents. Society is comfortable
not punishing a defendant when his accuser bears equal fault. 322
Second, this outcome is consistent with agency law while
furthering tort-liability objectives. This approach leaves
imputation untouched. It recognizes, however, that imputation
functions differently when raised as part of a defense. 323 Limiting
imputation to its proper function furthers the tort-liability
objectives of deterring wrongdoing and compensating victims.
Preventing a corporation from recovering from third-parties when
its policies are deficient incentivizes those with the ability to
monitor the corporation—the directors and officers—to create and

a court engage in the type of accounting that in pari delicto is meant to
avoid . . . .”).
322. See, e.g., AHERF, 989 A.2d 313, 329 (Pa. 2010) (“[I]n pari delicto serves
the public interest by relieving courts from lending their offices to mediating
disputes among wrongdoers, as well as by deterring illegal conduct.”).
323. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03(b) (2006) (stating that a
principal’s claim against an auditor “should not be defeated by imputing to the
principal its agents’ knowledge of deficiencies in the processes under scrutiny”).
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implement proper procedures. 324 Even shareholders, who are not
realistically in a position to monitor management, 325 can inform
themselves of such policies and determine if they are sufficient. If
a shareholder finds corporate policies deficient or questionable,
the shareholder can move on to a less risky investment. It may be
unrealistic to expect shareholders of large corporations to
investigate and monitor corporate fraud-detection systems. 326 But
evaluating corporate fault in a way that could be monitored
empowers shareholders and diminishes the risk that the fraud of
one insider could undermine the entire value of their investment.
By affording shareholders the opportunity to monitor and control
their investment, application of the in pari delicto defense seems
less harsh. 327
Third, this approach addresses the concern that auditors will
necessarily be less culpable than the corporation’s fraudulent
agents. 328 Even if this is so, when the acts of the auditor are
properly measured against the corporation rather than the agent,
the balance might shift. If it does not, in pari delicto would
apply. 329 If it does—that is, if the fraudulently prepared financial
statement was unsanctioned and undetected by a corporation

324. Cf. NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 887 (N.J. 2006)
(finding that, to deter future wrongdoing, courts should “not indiscriminately
provide a safe haven for [auditors’] allegedly negligent conduct”).
325. See, e.g., id. at 886 (noting that “the nature of today’s corporation
makes it increasingly unlikely that shareholders of large corporations have the
ability to effectively monitor the actions of corporate officials”).
326. But see id. at 885 (noting that “shareholders with a substantial
ownership of stock may have the ability to affect board elections” which gives
them some measure of control and access to information).
327. Cf. id. (“Allowing the impropriety of some shareholders—who, as
directors and officers, perpetrated or did not prevent the fraud—to bar all
shareholders from recovery is unfair and improper.”).
328. See, e.g., id. at 904 (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) (noting that the
“auditor’s role in the accurate presentation of a client’s financial statement is
limited, and most importantly, secondary to that of the client”).
329. But see AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (suggesting that
in pari delicto should never be an available defense against an auditor because
of an auditor’s distinct role); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b
(2006) (taking the position that a “principal’s claim against the service provider
[retained to assess the accuracy of its financial reporting] should not be defeated
by imputing to the principal its agents’ knowledge of deficiencies in the
processes under scrutiny”).
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with sound systems—the auditor will be responsible to the
corporation for its negligent work.
Another concern, expressed by the New York Court of
Appeals, is that a double standard is created when you hold the
auditor responsible for its agent’s acts and you do not hold the
corporation responsible for its agent’s acts. 330 This posture,
however, is consistent with agency law and is especially
warranted against auditors because their work has effects beyond
their relationship with the corporation. This is consistent with
agency law because, as discussed at the beginning of this Part,
imputation functions properly when a principal defends against a
claim based on its agent’s wrongdoing. 331 A corporation acting as
a plaintiff acts as a distinct entity and imputation should not be
the only relevant factor in determining whether the plaintiff may
pursue a claim against its auditor for professional malpractice. 332
This approach should not require the auditor defendant to face
uncapped liability for the losses arising from the corporate fraud.
Rather, the auditor should be liable for damages proximately
caused by its negligent performance under the scope of its
engagement with the corporation. 333
330. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 958 (N.Y. 2010) (finding
that to allow suit by creditors and shareholders merely because they are
innocent parties would “creat[e] a double standard whereby the innocent
stakeholders of the corporation’s outside professionals are held responsible for
the sins of their errant agents while the innocent stakeholders of the
corporation itself are not”).
331. See id. at 953 (“[P]rincipals, rather than third parties, are best-suited to
police their chosen agents . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. c
(2006) (“It is helpful to view questions about imputation from the perspective of
risk assumption, taking into account the posture of the third party whose legal
relations with the principal are at issue.”); cf. Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 § 21D, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) (2006) (requiring proportionate liability in
private securities litigation).
332. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) (“Knowledge,
including imputed knowledge, is not always determinative of, and sometimes is
not even relevant to, certain claims and defenses.”).
333. See AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n. 246 (suggesting “a more thoughtful tact”
to auditor liability such as “the use of heightened pleading standards, standards
of liability (e.g. gross negligence), proof (e.g. clear and convincing evidence), and
measures designed to address liability” such as capping liability at some
multiple of audit fees); NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 889 (N.J.
2006) (finding that the auditor should be judged based on whether it “was
negligent in performing its agreed duties and to what extent such negligence
proximately contributed to the damages suffered by plaintiff”).
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Holding an auditor accountable for its work is also desirable
because an auditor’s role is unique and has implications beyond
its performance under the contract with the corporation. Auditors
“have duties not just to management, but to the public at
large.” 334 Auditors are hired in part because of the potential that
corporate officers will “misuse their powers and commit acts of
financial wrongdoing.” 335 To limit auditors’ accountability for
their performance as it relates to the very thing they were hired
to help monitor eliminates a large incentive to do a good job. At
the outset of an engagement, an auditor would know that the
likelihood of ever being held accountable for its work under the
agreement is minimal. In the only situation where its work is
likely to be scrutinized—the discovery of the corporation’s fraud—
it is immune from suit.
Further, if during the engagement the auditor suspects or
discovers fraud, it has two choices: (1) reveal the fraud or
investigate further, and risk harming its relationship with the
corporate officers whom it has just accused of fraud; or (2) ignore
the warning signals and continue the relationship. Knowing
auditors will face this choice, the law should take a firm position
that an auditor must choose to investigate and reveal fraud. The
threat of liability will incentivize the auditor to maintain sound
policies to monitor its individual agents, and individual agents
will be aware that the auditor may seek indemnification from
them upon a judgment against the auditor.
V. Conclusion
The in pari delicto defense is only available when a plaintiff
bears equal fault for the illegality at issue. Imputing a corporate
plaintiff with an agent’s fraud is an inadequate measure of fault
for this purpose. Imputation functions properly to allow third
parties to rely on their dealings with a principal’s agent. 336 It is
334. AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009).
335. Id.; see also AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 890 n.49 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that
policy justifies claims against auditors for malpractice because they are
“employed by a corporation’s outside directors to help them ensure the lawful
operation of the corporation”).
336. See DeMott, supra note 11, at 291 (noting that imputation functions to
“determin[e] a principal’s legal rights and obligations as between the principal
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not proper for the task of assigning fault to a corporation when
the corporation, as a plaintiff, seeks to recover from a third party
who harmed it. In this case, the corporation’s blameworthiness
deserves a more holistic assessment.
Evaluating the corporation’s information gathering and
reporting systems for this purpose would provide a measure of
the corporation which (1) better captures the acts of the
corporation as a whole, (2) allows the corporation to retain its
ability to sue its auditor for malpractice by implementing
adequate systems, (3) incentivizes corporations to pursue
rigorous anti-fraud systems, and (4) relieves auditors of liability
for malpractice only when the policy justifications for in pari
delicto are present. The historical approach to in pari delicto in
corporate auditor malpractice cases has proven inadequate. A
new approach is available and overdue.

and third parties with whom the agent deals on the principal’s behalf”).

